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TREATY LAW FOR THE PRIVATE
PRACTITIONER*
CLiF.roD J. HYNNINtT nn TIPACT oF SCIENCE and technology, economics and politics upon the
changing nature of man's world-what he produces, how he moves
about, and the manner in which he communicates his ideas and de-
sires-has tended to make international law, and treaty law in particular, of
increasing practical interest to many lawyers and their clients. They are finding
that a treaty or international agreement may govern the inheritance of prop-
erty and the withdrawal of its proceeds across international boundaries, may
direct the channels of international trade, may dictate the choice and manner
of making investments abroad, may facilitate the use of commercial arbitration
in private international disputes, and may protect the enjoyment of procedural
and substantive rights of foreign residents. Even tax lawyers and accountants
have become concerned with special treaties or conventions dealing with the
avoidance of the double taxation of income, estates and gifts.
The international counterpart to statute law-or "international legislation,"
as Judge Hudson termed his collection of treatiesO-treaty law has grown very
rapidly in the century.' The lawyer's tools for dealing with treaty law, however,
* This article is part of a larger work in process on "Private Property in International
Legal Practice."
t Member of the District of Columbia and Illinois bars; formerly attorney for the Treasury
Department.
' Consult Appendix infra at 71, listing commercial treaties (Table I); treaty provisions
relating to rights of inheritance, acquisition, and ownership of property (Table I); treaty
provisions relating to competency and rights of consular officers in relation to the settlement of
estates (Table III); treaties and other agreements relating to double taxation of income
(Table IV); treaties and other agreements relating to the double taxation of estates and gifts
(Table V).
A treaty does not ordinarily affect rights between a signatory state and its own nationals
with respect to matters of property. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 5 F. 2d 191
(C.A. 3d, 1925). But cf. the importance of treaty law (i.e., the Pact of Paris) in justifying the
exercise of international jurisdiction of the Nuremburg Tribunal over crimes committed by
the Nazi State against German nationals.
2 Hudson, International Legislation (1931).
3 "It has been estimated that in 1914 some 8,000 treaties were in force between the various
States of the world." Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. Int.
L. Supp., Part 11, 666 (1935) (hereinafter cited as Law of Treaties). During the period of the
League of Nations, its secretariat registered 4,835 treaties and international agreements. As
of January 1, 1955, the Secretariat of the United Nations had registered 4,207 treaties and
international agreements and had filed an additional 586. Letter to the author from the UN's
Office of Legal Affairs, dated February 14, 1955.
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have hardly kept pace with the volume of treaty production or the diverse
needs of clients.4 The sources of treaty law in the United States are not easy to
find or use, in part as a result of frequent shifts in publication practices of the
government and the substantial time lag in making the texts of treaties available
in practical form.5
It is the purpose of this article to outline some of the salient features of the
law of treaties that are most apt to concern a practitioner in handling on behalf
of a private party some matter which is affected by a provision of a treaty or
international agreement. It is not concerned with the substantive provisions of
particular treaties;- nor is it concerned with those aspects of treaty law that are
primarily, if not exclusively, of concern to the legal advisers in foreign offices
and to the professors of international relations.7 Of course, there remains a com-
mon ground of interest in treaty law that should concern both the private
practitioner and the public international law expert.
I. ScopE oF TEY, TREATY PowER
In the United States the power to make treaties and other international
agreements is lodged exclusively in the federal government; it is expressly for-
bidden to the states under the Constitution.8 Since the very inception of the
Constitution, and even before,9 the power to make treaties has been regarded
4 Aside from general texts on international law, the latest reference work on treaty law in
the United States is Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (1916). In many re-
spects the detailed comments on the Harvard Research draft convention, op. cit. supra note 3,
are more useful than Crandall, but they also date back decades. In England the standard
work on treaty law is McNair, The Law of Treaties-British Practice and Opinions (1938).
McNair later became Judge of the International Court of Justice. There is of course a vast
periodical literature.
5 Consult Section VI infra.
6 For an analysis of treaty provisions on particular subjects, see: Boyd, Treaties Govern-
ing the Succession to Real Property by Aliens, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1001 (1953); Opton, Recog-
nition of Foreign Heirship and Succession Rights to Personal Property in America, 19 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 156 (1950); Meekison, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of Personal
Property, 44 Am. J. Int. L. 313 (1950); a series of articles by Wilson: Property-Protection
Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 45 Am. J. Int. L. 83 (1951); Access-to-
Courts Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 47 Am. J. Int. L. 20 (1953); and
Natural-Resources Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 48 Am. J. Int. L. 355
(1954); and Wilson, The International Law Standard in Treaties of the United States (1953).
7 For example, this article does not deal with such matters as the formalities of treaties or
the capacity of various types of governments to enter into treaties.
8 Art. I, § 10. In Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1878), the Supreme Court used this
clause in holding the Confederacy to be without legal existence.
"The treaty-making power is not distributed; it is all vested in the national government;
no part of it is vested in or reserved to the states.... [tihere is but one nation, acting in direct
relation to and representation of every citizen in every state." Root, The Real Questions under
the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 Am. J. Int. L. 273,
278 (1907).
9 In Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199 (1796), the Supreme Court enforced the British
treaty made with the Confederation in 1783, the provisions of which contemplated overturning
a revolutionary statute of Virginia seizing Tory property.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
as a very broad power."0 The exercise of the treaty power has varied with the
international responsibilities of the United States." No treaty or executive
agreement has yet been held to be unconstitutional, 2 but the court opinions
have usually emphasized that the treaty power is not one unlimited by the
Constitution."
Varying terminology is employed in the Constitution referring to the docu-
ments through which the United States arrives at understandings with foreign
countries for the conduct of relations with one another and their nationals. In
Article II, Section 2, the President is given the power "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties." However, the limitations on
state power in Article I, Section 10, use the additional words, "Alliance, or
10 "The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain
to our foreign relations, and agreement with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of
the United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such countries within the
United States, and the disposition of the property of aliens dying within the territory of the
respective parties, is within the scope of that power, and any conflicting law of the State must
yield." Chief Justice Hughes in Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
11 "The only question is whether it [the migratory bird treaty with Canada] is forbidden by
some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider
what this country has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved." Mr. Justice
Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
12 In United States v. Capps, 204 F. 2d 655 (C.A. 4th, 1953), Judge Parker of the Fourth
Circuit firmly rejected the contention of the government that the "seed purpose" potato
agreement with Canada was "pursuant to the inherent powers of the President under the
Constitution" by saying: "We think that whatever the power of the executive with respect
to making executive trade agreements regulating foreign commerce in the absence of action
by Congress, it is clear that the executive may not through entering into such an agreement
avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by Congress. Imports from a foreign country
are foreign commerce subject to regulation, so far as this country is concerned, by Congress
alone. The executive may not by-pass congressional limitations regulating such commerce by
entering into an agreement with the foreign country that the regulation be exercised by that
country through its control over exports." Ibid., at 659.
The Capps case was affirmed by the Supreme Court on contract grounds without any
discussion of the constitutional argument made by Judge Parker. United States v. Capps,
348 U.S. 296 (1955). It was, however, cited with approval by the U.S. Court of Claims in
Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 606 (1955),where Judge Madden declared: "Whatever
may be the true doctrine as to formally ratified treaties which conflict with the Constitution,
we think that there can be no doubt that an executive agreement, not being a transaction
which is even mentioned in the Constitution, cannot impair Constitutional rights."
In the Seery case, the Court of Claims held that a lump-sum settlement by an executive
agreement, which contained a specific provision on waiver of claims arising out of United
States military operations in Austria, did not bar a claim by an American citizen for alleged
damage to her property in Austria by military forces of the United States. The court stressed
the fact that Austria was "liberated" rather than "enemy" territory. Cf. cases cited note
45 infra.
13 "The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those
restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its
departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the
States." Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). Generally, see Cowles, Treaties and Con-
stitutional Law: Property Interferences and Due Process of Law (1941).
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Confederation" and "Agreement or Compact.' 4 The unique characteristic of a
"treaty" under the Constitution is that the particular document has been sub-
mitted to the Senate which has consented thereto by a two-thirds majority. If
that has occurred, the document is a treaty in a constitutional sense, regardless
of the name on the face of the document. All international acts of the United
States that do not constitutionally qualify as "treaties" are agreements. This
distinction is wholly without significance in international law. 5
It is improbable that the federal form of government constitutes any bar on
the treaty-making power-except insofar as the constitutional distribution of
powers may condition the interpretative approach of courts upon occasion, or
may restrain the Department of State's approach to the international unifica-
tion of private law." Innumerable treaties and agreements have been made with
respect to a variety of subjects that have conventionally been thought to lie
within the primary province of the states: real and personal property rights of
aliens, fisheries, wildlife, administration of estates, rights of individuals and
corporations, etc." In the making of treaties, the President "alone negotiates,"' 8
with the Senate given the power to approve by a two-thirds majority. It was
the role of the Senate, occasionally called the "graveyard of treaties," that was
the particular object of Professor McClure's criticism. He concluded that:
[F]or controversial international acts the Senate method may well be quietly
abandoned, and the instruments handled as executive agreements. But for large num-
bers of purely routine acts, about which no public opinion exists and no question as
to their acceptability arises, the present method [of Senate consent to treaties] is de-
14 Apparently the consent of Congress has never been given to a State to enter into an
"Agreement or Compact... with a foreign Power." 5 Hackworth, Digest of International
Law 24-25 (1943).
1In Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912), a commercial agreement made
under the authority of the Tariff Act of 1897 was regarded as "a treaty under the Circuit
Court of Appeals Act, and, where its construction is directly involved, as it is here, there is a
right of review by direct appeal to this court." Ibid., at 601.
16 Note that an argument of constitutional federalism has at times been asserted in the
United States in justifying the negativist position of the United States toward conferences
on the international unification of law. For a history of this position, see Nadelmann, Ignored
State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts To Unify Rules of Private
Law, 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 323 (1954). It would appear that Professor Nadelmann's con-
clusion that "the treaty-making power of the Federal Government... should not be stretched
so as to cover areas for which it was not created" (ibid., at 359) is not supported by the con-
stitutional record of the use of the treaty power since the very earliest days of the Republic.
The treaty of peace of 1783 was designed to deal with private rights, and Art. VI of the
Constitution assured that those very treaty provisions would be enforced by the courts.
For a fuller discussion see the author's forthcoming article in the American Bar Associa-
tion Journal on The International Unification of Law Affecting Private Property.
17 Consult list in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, on
S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. 843-47 (1953).
1M Mr. Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936).
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sirable as saving the time of the House of Representatives without increasing the
present burdens of the Senate.
This use of congressional-executive power should become the characteristic method
of expression for American international policy.19
The central thesis of McClure was the complete interchangeability of treaties
and executive agreements: "The President can do by executive agreement any-
thing that he can do by treaty, provided Congress by law coperates."' s Ad-
mittedly quite controversial,2' the interchangeability thesis probably lay at the
basis of the movement for the Bricker Amendment. Exaggerations and mis-
statements have undoubtedly occurred on both sides of the controversy over
executive agreements. The unwary can easily misconstrue the statements made
on either side. To this writer only the combined executive-congressional agree-
ment can be said to be truly interchangeable with a treaty, at least insofar as
changing the domestic law of the United States is concerned."2 The widespread
interest displayed in the Bricker Amendment, and the support thereof by a large
component of the organized bar, has already operated as a force of self-restraint
upon the executive and upon the courts in passing upon the executive's assertion
of the treaty power.
With particular reference to the trade agreements under the Reciprocal
Trade Act of 1934, Sayre wrote:
But the President in making executive agreements has no such free hand. He must
act scrupulously within the laws and conform to the policies already established
by the Congress. 2
3
It is a plain fact, as Professor Hyde has stated, that there are "instances where
a Secretary of State has felt that for purposes of agreement the use of a treaty
19 McClure, International Executive Agreements, 378-79 (1941). The concluding sentence
could hardly have been calculated to win friends for the executive agreements approach or to
influence people in the Senate.
20 Ibid., at 363. This thesis has been argued at great length with cogency and vehemence
by McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 Yale L.J. 181, 534 (1945). They cited
extended practice including the acquisition of territory, the settlement of international claims
(usually by, rather than against, the United States), adherence to international organizations,
trade agreements, international financial problems, and war debts.
2 The counterargument to the interchangeability thesis has been stated by Professor
Borchard in Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 Yale L.J. 616 (1945), wherein
Borchard listed ten particulars for distinguishing between a "treaty" and an "executive
agreement." To the present writer it would appear that most of the alleged distinctions are
without merit.
12 This statement is at variance with much of the specific language of United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942), and possibly with the actual holding of that case, although that is more
debatable. It is believed that the Pink case set the high-water mark of the judicial doctrine
on executive agreements and that the courts are now in retreat from that doctrine. Cf. judge
Parker's opinion in the Capps case, op. cit. supra note 12.
2" The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 Col. L. Rev. 751, 755 (1939).
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was obligatory. 2 4 That appears to be particularly true for such subjects as
taxation.25
The two outstanding expositions of the effect of executive agreements upon
domestic law arose out of the Litvinov agreement of November 16, 1933, under
which the United States recognized the U.S.S.R. in return for pledges of ending
communist propaganda in the United States and the "assignment" of Soviet
rights to property within the United States. In United States v. Belmont26 the
government sued as assignee of the Soviet government for the proceeds of bank
deposits that had been made in New York by a czarist corporation which was
subsequently nationalized in Russia by a Soviet decree. There were no conflict-
ing claims by American creditors. The Court upheld the government, notwith-
standing existing New York court decisions which had refused to recognize
Soviet nationalization measures. Terming the President the "sole organ" of the
international relations of the United States, the court held that an international
compact by the President had the same supremacy over state laws as treaties.
The language was broad, but the actual decision may be rationalized as a conse-
quence of the "recognition" of the U.S.S.R. by the United States in the absence
of a conflicting domestic interest.
The second case is United States v. Pink7 where the government had insti-
tuted an action to recover the remaining assets of the New York branch of the
First Russian Insurance Company after the payment of all domestic creditors.
The only conflicting claims were those of foreign creditors of the parent Russian
insurance company. The real parties in interest in the proceeding were United
States citizens as beneficiaries under the Litvinov assignment versus foreign
creditors of the Russian parent company of the New York branch. In the appeal
it was agreed that the policy of the New York courts against recognizing the
effectiveness of Soviet nationalization decrees with respect to Russian-owned
assets in New York would have to give way if the Litvinov assignment had
taken the form of a treaty. The Court held "The same result obtains here" in
the case of an executive agreement.
28
24 2 Hyde, International Law-Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States
1417 (2d rev. ed., 1945).
21 Note that the various tax arrangements for the relief of United States expenditures
abroad from foreign taxes in the NATO countries (which the author helped to negotiate as the
Treasury representative on the Rubin Mission) were entirely unilateral, i.e., they provided
for relief for the United States from foreign taxes, and hence could properly be made in the
form of executive agreements. Consult Efron and Hill, Foreign Taxes on United States Ex-
penditures, 23 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 371 (1954).
On the other hand, several of the earlier agreements for the avoidance of double taxation
on income from shipping were in the form of executive agreements. Consult Appendix,
Table IV.
26301 U.S. 324 (1937).
27 315 U.S. 203 (1942). Followed in Steingnt v. Guaranty Trust Co., 58 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.
N.Y., 1944), aff'd 161 F. 2d 571 (C.A. 2d, 1947), cert. dismissed by petitioner 332 U.S. 753
(1947).
28 Justice Douglas wrote the opinion; Justices Jackson and Reed took no part, and Justices
Roberts and Stone dissented.
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The Pin case aroused great comment when it was decided,2 and its reception
has continued to be a critical one. Probably few would today quarrel with the
actual holding as to the effect of the assignment of the rights of the nationalizing
government to funds owned by the nationalized corporation within the United
States in the absence of any conflicting claims to those funds by American
creditors. The language used, however, to justify this result, which properly
belongs to the law of international expropriations rather than the law of treaties,
was far broader with respect to the efficacy of executive agreements than was
necessary to the actual holding of the Supreme Court, which could be justified
without reference to the effect of the executive agreement. This is of course not
to argue that the executive act of extending "recognition" to a foreign govern-
ment may not have important consequences in American law, but those conse-
quences cannot properly be said to derive from the treaty-making power or the
analogy thereto of the executive agreement.3° The only judicial check, however,
to the executive theory of executive agreements, as developed in the Belmont
and Pink cases, is the opinion of Judge Parker in United States v. Capps,"'
whether gratuitously expressed or otherwise, that an executive agreement can-
not supplant the procedures provided by an act of Congress within its proper
legislative field. The Supreme Court, however, declined to consider the merits
of Judge Parker's views on the treaty aspects.32
The effect of a treaty upon domestic law was one of the key diplomatic prob-
lems of the American Republic that led directly to the formulation of the treaty
provision in Article VI of the Constitution." Under the Articles of Confedera-
tion there was the gravest doubt as to the binding effect of the peace treaties
29 Professor Borchard attacked the decision on the grounds that "[Tihe court has upset
and parted with international law, as heretofore understood, gravely impaired or weakened the
protection to private property afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution, endowed a mere executive agreement by exchange of notes with the constitutional
force of a formal treaty, misconstrued the agreement, and, it is respectfully submitted, con-
fused that foreign policy of the United States in whose alleged support this revolutionary de-
cision was thought necessary." 36 Am. J. Int. L. 275 (1942). A more temperate comment was
made by Professor Jessup in the same journal: "[Tihe effect of the Pink case may well prove
to be salutary in the disposition of the mass of litigation which could have been anticipated
as a result of the so-called nationalization decrees of the Dutch and Norwegian Governments,
now in exile. The fact that this opinion has been handed down at the threshold of what might
well have proved to be a flood of litigation may fend off many actions. In this respect, the
situation is far better than that which confronted the courts when the maze of Russian cases
descended upon them, beginning with the Wulfsohn and Cibrario cases in 1923." 36 Am. J.
Int. L. 282, 286 (1942).
30 For a contrary view see Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President To Conclude
International Agreements, 64 Yale L.J. 345, 376 (1955).
3204 F. 2d 655 (C.A. 4th, 1953).
3United States v. Capps, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
3 "[AII Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
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upon the individual states, but such doubts "must be entirely removed by the
6th article of the Constitution.13 4 The leading case is also the very first case
decided under the treaty power, Ware v. Hylton, which resulted in the invalida-
tion of a revolutionary statute of Virginia of 1777 that sequestered British-
owned debts contrary to the provisions of the British peace treaty of 1783. The
Supreme Court said, "A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is of
all the United States, if any act of a state legislature can stand in its way."35
This case was followed by many others striking down state legislation or court
decisions that were found to conflict with the treaty provisions (in the peace
treaty of 1783 and Jay's treaty of 1794) with respect to the property rights of
British subjects.3" Other cases have reversed state action against the treaty
rights of aliens to inherit or acquire property 7 or to engage in occupations,35
31 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199 (1796).
Ibid., at 236. The Court was not unmindful of the possible injustice to the debtor who
might have to pay his debt twice and specifically alluded to the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which was of course not applicable to the Virginia statute. "Although Virginia
is not bound to make compensation to the debtors, yet it is evident that they ought to be in-
demnified, and it [is] not to be supposed, that those whose duty it may be to make the com-
pensation, will permit the rights of our citizens to be sacrificed to a public object, without the
fullest indemnity." Ibid., at 245. For the effect of this decision upon the fortunes of Thomas
Jefferson, see Malone, Jefferson and His Time, Vol. 1: Jefferson-The Virginian 260, 441-45
(1948).
"6 The cases include: Higginson v. Mein, 4 Cranch (U.S.) 415 (1808) (involving a Georgia
statute sequestering the interest of a British mortgagee), followed in Hughes v. Edwards, 9
Wheat. (U.S.) 489 (1824); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 603 (1813)
(which involved the British title to land as distinguished from debts over a title derived from
the attempted escheat under Virginia law). Also see the same case in 1 Wheat. (U.S.) 304
(1816). Followed in Craig v. Radford, 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 594 (1818); Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat.
(U.S.) 453 (1819); Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 242 (1830); and Carver v. Astor, 4 Pet.
(U.S.) 1 (1830).
37 Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (U.S.) 259 (1817); Carneal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. (U.S.) 181
(1825). In Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929), the Supreme Court invalidated a discrimina-
tory succession tax by Iowa on property held in the state by a foreign decedent. The same tax
law had been upheld under the same treaty with respect to a foreign beneficiary, as distin-
guished from a decedent, in Petersen v. Iowa, 245 U.S. 170 (1917).
39 Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), which overturned a Seattle ordinance licensing
pawnbrokers as in conflict with the Japanese treaty; and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Com-
mission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
Compare Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927), where a municipal ordi-
nance forbidding the issuance of a pool-hall license to aliens prevailed over a treaty guar-
anteeing "reciprocal liberties of commerce."
The earlier cases upholding state legislation for the purpose of preventing Japanese from
owning or leasing agricultural land-Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Frick v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); and Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923)-have been invali-
dated under the 14thAmendmentin SeiFujiiv. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718,242 P. 2d 617 (1952),
in accordance with the suggestion given by the Supreme Court in Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948). For comment on the Oyama case and a detailed historical survey of the
problem of alienage, see Conflict Between Local and National Interests in Alien Landholding
Restrictions, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 315 (1949).
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subject to "the normal scope of the police power." 39 Treaty provisions have
prevailed over state statutes of limitations, 40 over probate court practice with
respect to the powers of foreign consuls to administer the property of aliens, 41
over state policy with respect to the limitation of tort liability,42 and even over
state taxation.
43
A treaty prevails over inconsistent state legislation without regard to the
date of such legislation. The state law may predate the treaty, or it may follow
the treaty in time; in either case it fails if it is in conflict with the treaty.44 A dif-
ferent rule applies to the conflict between a treaty or an international agreement
and an act of Congress, where the one later in date is commonly said to prevail.
4
It is clear that a later act of Congress prevails over a conflicting provision of a
treaty, so far as the national courts of the United States are concerned. Such an
act of Congress, however, cannot affect the international status of the treaty
with the foreign country which may not have given its consent to the congres-
sional modification or repeal of the treaty.
4
39 "A sensible and just reading of the treaties certainly does not withdraw the normal
scope of the police power from the states." Justice Frankfurter (sitting on the District Court)
in Pearl Assurance Co. v. Harrington, 38 F. Supp. 411, 414 (D. Mass., 1941), aff'd 313 U.S.
549 (1941), rehearing denied 314 U.S. 707 (1941).
40 Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch (U.S.) 454 (1806), which held that the peace treaty of 1783
prevented the running of a Virginia statute of limitations on British debts.
41 Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931), which sustained the right of an Italian consul
to claim intestate property in New York on behalf of an alien beneficiary. This question de-
pends upon peculiar technicalities in the exact wording of treaty provisions. Cf. Rocca v.
Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1912), where substantially the contrary resulted under the Argen-
ine treaty of 1853.
42 Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E. 2d 880 (1949), upheld the
limitations of the Warsaw Convention over New York law. Consult, Accidents in International
Air Transportation-Limitations of Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 237 (1949).
41 State authorities have deferred to the "national treatment" provisions of the double
tax treaties with the United Kingdom (art. 21), France (art. 5), the Netherlands (art. 25), and
Denmark (art. 16).
44 A treaty cannot affect the right of a state to tax property prior to the date of the treaty.
Prevost v. Greneaux, 19 How. (U.S.) 1 (1856), which involved a Louisiana succession tax on a
transfer by death occurring prior to the French treaty of 1853.
4 The agreement with Yugoslavia in 1948, which contained a waiver of maritime claims,
overrode the consent of the United States to be sued for maritime claims under the Public
Vessels Act. Ozanic v. United States, 188 F. 2d 228 (C.A. 2d, 1951). In Neri v. United States,
204 F. 2d 867 (C.A. 2d, 1953), a similar waiver was involved under art. 76 of the Italian
Treaty of Peace. "[Tin case of a conflict between an act of Congress and a treaty... the one
last in date must prevail." Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 324 (1904).
46 Potter, Relative Authority of International Law and National Law in the United States,
19 Am. J. Int. L. 315 (1925), which contains a strong criticism of the "more recent date" doc-
tri ne, citing several interesting decisions by the Court of Claims with respect to conflicts
between federal statutes and international law, and conflicts between treaties with the United
States and foreign laws.
It was formerly Swiss law that a treaty prevailed over conflicting Swiss legislation, irrespec-
tive of the date of such legislation. With the change in Swiss law, there is no country which has
recognized the superiority of a treaty over later national legislation. See Rice, The Position
of International Treaties in Swiss Law, 46 Am. J. Int. L. 641 (1952).
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With a few exceptions, 4 the cases have involved the conflict between an
earlier treaty and a later act of Congress, with the latter prevailing. The "more
recent date" doctrine entered our law with the case of Taylor v. Morton.48 That
case involved the imposition of higher duties on imports under a later tariff act
in conflict with the provisions of an earlier treaty with Russia. Speaking for the
circuit court, Justice Curtis said:
If the act of Congress, because it is the later law, must prescribe the rule by which
this case is to be determined, we do not inquire whether it proceeds upon a just inter-
pretation of the treaty, or an accurate knowledge of the facts of likeness or unlikeness
of the articles, or whether it was an accidental or purposed departure from the treaty;
and if the latter, whether the reasons for that departure are such as commend them-
selves to the just judgment of mankind....
To refuse to execute a treaty, for reasons which approve themselves to the con-
scientious judgment of the nation, is a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy; but
the power to do so, is prerogative, of which no nation can be deprived, without deeply
affecting its independence. 49
This doctrine was later approved by the Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robert-
Son 5
A treaty is regarded as "self-executing" if it may be enforced by the courts
without further legislation by the Congress. In this respect the treaty practice
47 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), appears to be the only case in which a
later treaty has operated to overrule an earlier act of Congress.
"In fact, however, there have been few (the writer is not certain that there have been any)
instances in which a treaty inconsistent with a prior act of Congress has been given full force
and effect as law in this country without the assent of Congress. There may indeed have been
cases in which, by treaty, certain action has been taken without reference to existing Federal
laws, as, for example, where by treaty certain populations have been collectively naturalized,
but such treaty action has not operated to repeal or annul the existing law upon the subject.
Furthermore, with specific reference to commercial arrangements with foreign powers, Con-
gress has explicitly denied that a treaty can operate to modify the arrangements which it,
by statute, has provided, and, in actual practice, has in every instance succeeded in main-
taining this point." 1 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States 555 (1929).
48 23 Fed. Cas. 784, No. 13,799 (D. Mass., 1855), aff'd 2 Black (U.S.) 481 (1862).
49 Ibid., at 785, 786.
60 124 U.S. 190 (1888). The Court said, "By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that
instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over
the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to con-
strue them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of
either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided
always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.... It follows, therefore,
that when a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts for
want of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty not already executed. Considerations
of that character belong to another department of the government. The duty of the courts is
to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will." Ibid., at 194. Also
see The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. (U.S.) 616 (1870); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580
(1884); Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 (1910); Rainey v. United States, 232
U.S. 310 (1914); and United States v. Rathjen Bros., 137 F. 2d 103 (Cust. & Pat. App., 1943).
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of the United States is signally different from that of Canada, 1 the United
Kingdom and the British Commonwealth,52 and most other countries, in which a
treaty does not become legally enforceable, nor does it have any effect upon pri-
vate rights, until it is aided by domestic legislation. 3 The test in the United
States as to whether a given treaty is self-executing is the intention of the gov-
ernment in negotiating the treaty. The fact that this determination is not al-
ways simple is demonstrated by the United States-Spanish treaty of 1829 which
was found by the Supreme Court, speaking through the same Chief Justice,
John Marshall, to be non-self-executing in Foster v. Neilson54 and to be self-
5 For an extraordinary example of Canadian practice, see Attorney-General for Canada v.
Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council held that the International Labor Convention could not be adopted by the Canadian
Parliament without the assent of the provinces, stating: "Within the British Empire there is a
well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of
its obligations, if they entail alteration of the exsiting domestic law, requires legislative action.
Unlike some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire,
by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law.... But in a State where the Legislature
does not possess absolute authority, in a federal State where legislative authority is limited by a
constitutional document, or is divided up between different Legislatures in accordance with the
classes of subject-matter submitted for legislation, the problem is complex. The obligations
imposed by treaty may have to be performed, if at all, by several Legislatures; and the execu-
tive have the task of obtaining the legislative assent not of the one Parliament to whom they
may be responsible, but possibly of several Parliaments to whom they stand in no direct
relation." Ibid., at 347, 348.
Generally see Nettl, The Treaty Enforcement Power in Federal Constitutions, 28 Can. Bar
Rev. 1051 (1950), for a comparison of treaty practices in Canada, the United States, and
Australia.
52 "But in the United Kingdom, whenever a treaty (other than treaties relating to belliger-
ent action), or anything done in pursuance of it, is likely to come into question in a court of
law, or require for its enforcement the assistance of a court of law, the questions at once will
arise whether the provisions of the treaty accord with the existing law of the land and whether
any action proposed to be taken by the Crown to execute the treaty is authorized by the
existing law of the land. If the answer to either of these questions is in the negative, the Crown
must induce Parliament to legislate so as to make the necessary change in the law or to equip
the Crown with the necessary power to execute the treaty. If Parliament declines to do so,
the Crown will not ratify the treaty; if by imprudence the Crown has already ratified the
treaty, the United Kingdom is bound by it (for the Crown is internationally omnicompetent
in the matter of treaties), and the Crown must do its best to extricate the country from an
embarrassing situation. Even the fact that the treaty has been ratified and is internationally
binding upon the United Kingdom, does not enable a British court to give effect to it munici-
pally if it should conflict with the law of the land. Nevertheless, a duty to make reparation
for any resulting breach of an international obligation would arise." McNair, The Law of
Treaties-British Practice and Opinions 7 (1938).
In British treaty practice, parliamentary approval frequently precedes the Crown's ratifica-
tion. See Preuss, On Amending the Treaty-making Power: A Comparative Study of the
Problem of Self-executing Treaties, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1117 (1953).
53 Consult Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, on S.J. Res.
130, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 322 (1952); American Bar Association Exhibits, A Comparison of
the Treaty-making Power in the United States of America and Other Countries 490, and
Modem Constitutional Provisions Concerning the Treaty-making Power 496, 848 (1952);
and Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, on S.J. Res. 1, 83d
Cong. 1st Sess. 1113-21 (1953).
r 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253 (1829).
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executing in United States v. Perceman.5 The clue to these variable results
involving the same treaty was found in that case in the variations between the
English and Spanish texts, the Spanish text not being available in 1829. In ex-
plaining the test, Chief Justice Marshall said:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it
operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform a par-
ticular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;
and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the
Court.56
Somewhat different language was used by Justice Miller in the Head Money
Cases to the same general effect:
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens
or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which
partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as be-
tween private parties in the courts of the country.5
Even when treaties deal with related subject matters, such as patents and trade-
marks, one treaty may be held to be non-self-executing, s while another is held
to be self-executing.59 The Warsaw Convention on aviation limiting the liability
of air lines for accidents has been held to be self-executing. 0
Where a treaty depends for its effectiveness upon the appropriation of money
by the Congress, the treaty is plainly non-self-executing.6 ' Prior to 1934, the
I7 Pet. (U.S.) 51 (1833). The first decision on a self-executing treaty was in United States
v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 103 (1801), where Chief Justice Marshall took notice of
a treaty with France which had been ratified after the admiralty court had condemned the
captured vessel. Generally, see Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-executing Treaties,
45 Proc. Am. Soc. Int. L. 66 (1951).
56 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 314 (1829).
67 112 U.S. 58Q, 598 (1884).
5 The provision of the Versailles treaty for a six months extension for the filing of German
patents was held non-self-executing in Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F. 2d 495 (C.A.
4th, 1929), cert. denied 280 U.S. 571 (1929). The Court cited the use of "language of futurity."
59 Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940). The Brussels Convention of 1900 was
held self-executing in Hennebique Const. Co. v. Myers, 172 Fed. 869 (C.A. 3d, 1909), while the
convention of 1883 was held non-self-executing in Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D.C. 73 (1903).
10 Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D. N.Y., 1944);
Ross v. Pan American Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E. 2d 880 (1949); and Lee v. Pan American
Airways, 275 App. Div. 855, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 888 (1949), motion for leave to appeal to Court of
Appeals denied 275 App. Div. 962,90 N.Y.S. 2d 904 (1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
61 Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 Fed. Cas. 344, No. 14,251 (D. Mich.,
1852).
The question arose in connection with the Jay Treaty, which had been approved by the
Senate, whether the House of Representatives was bound to vote the appropriation, with
Hamilton and Madison taking opposite sides. The necessary funds were voted, but Madison
secured the passage of a resolution affirming "the Constitutional right and duty of the House
of Representatives... to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying" out the
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Department of State apparently took the position that a treaty reciprocally
reducing tariff duties could not be self-executing in view of the special constitu-
tional position of the House of Representatives over revenue,12 but with the
passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act the question became academic.
Similarly, the double tax treaties are regarded as self-executing, in part as a
result of the specific language repeated in the annual revenue acts.63 The "most-
favored-nation" clause, on the other hand, has not been treated by the Depart-
ment of State as requiring congressional legislation.6 4 Self-executing treaties
may:
[A]dd territory to the United States, supersede conflicting state or federal statutes,
create exemptions from jurisdiction, invest aliens with the privilege of entering the
United States, or provide for the surrender of fugitives from justice. 5
After a highly controversial litigation in California, the Charter of the United
Nations has been held to be non-self-executing insofar as the human rights pro-
visions thereof are concerned. The litigation arose out of an attack on the Alien
Land Law which forbade aliens, who were ineligible to become citizens, to ac-
quire or use real property. The District Court of Appeals for the Second District
held the California statute invalid as in conflict with the UN Charter. 6  When
treaty. 6 Madison, Writings 264 (Hunt's ed., 1906). In De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901),
the Supreme Court specifically said, "We express no opinion as to whether Congress is bound
to appropriate the money." Ibid., at 198.
62 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 179 (1943). Treaties defining crimes and
extending criminal jurisdiction apparently fall into a somewhat special class. Ibid., at 177-78.
In The Over the Top, 5 F. 2d 838 (D. Conn., 1925), a federal district judge in Connecticut,
sitting in a libel action against a cargo of liquor, said with reference to the American-British
treaty of 1924 (on prohibition enforcement): "It is not the function of treaties to enact the
fiscal or criminal law of a nation. For this purpose no treaty is self-executing." Ibid., at 845.
6 3 Evans, op. cit. supra note 55, at 69.
64American Express Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cust. App. 146 (1913); 5 Hackworth,
Digest of International Law 180-83 (1943).
6 Dickenson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-executing, 20 Am. J. Int. L. 444, 449 (1926). A
more limited view was early stated by Chandler P. Anderson that no treaty could be self-
executing if it dealt "with those powers which are delegated by the Constitution exclusively
to Congress." The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-making Power under the Constitu-
tion, 1 Am. J. Int. L. 636, 654 (1907). This view was specifically rejected in Robertson v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 32 F. 2d 495 (C.A. 4th, 1929): "We think, however, that the better view is
that a treaty affecting patent rights [created by and dependent upon statutes which only Con-
gress has power to enact] may be so drawn as to be self-executing." Ibid., at 500.
66 "A perusal of the Charter renders it manifest that restrictions contained in the Alien Land
Law are in direct conflict with the plain terms of the Charter ... [referring to the Preamble
and to articles 1, 2, and 551 and with the purposes announced therein by its framers.... Clear-
ly such a discrimination against a people of one race is contrary both to the letter and to the
spirit of the Charter which, as a treaty, is paramount to every law of every State in conflict
with it. The Alien Land Law must therefore yield to the treaty as the superior authority." Sei
Fujii v. California, 217 P. 2d 481, 488 (Cal. App., 1950), aff'd 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617
(1952). Compare Re Drummon Wren, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674, where the Canadian court cited
the UN Charter as among the evidences of the public policy of the Dominion to justify the
voiding of a restrictive covenant forbidding the sale of land, to "Jews or to persons of objec.'
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this case reached the California Supreme Court, a great furor had developed
over the portending dangers of the misuse of the treaty power as depicted by the
advocates of the Bricker Amendment. The Alien Land Law remained invalid
but the grounds shifted from the UN Charter to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Without referring to the opinion of the District Court of Appeals, the California
Supreme Court found the UN Charter to be non-self-executing:
The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance of funda-
mental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate
an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification.
Instead, they are framed as a promise of future action by the member nations.
67
Several other state courts have reached the same result with respect to the UN
Charter."
II. THREE "R's": RATIFICATION, RESERVATION, REGISTRATION
The operative date of a treaty is the date of ratification, unless the treaty
provides otherwise. 9 Formerly it was the rule in the United States that the
'ratification of a treaty operated retroactively to the date of the signature of the
treaty,70 contrary to the universal practice elsewhere. 7' It is believed that this is
no longer the law in the United States,72 and the earlier rule was at no time ap-
tionable nationality." Consult, Anti-Discrimination Legislation and International Declara-
tions as Evidence of Public Policy against Racial Restrictive Covenants, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
477 (1946).
6738 Cal. 2d 718, 724, 242 P. 2d 617, 621 (1952).
6 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W. 2d 110 (1953),
aff'd 348 U.S. 880 (1954), which upheld the right of a cemetery to exclude a Korean War
veteran who was part Indian under a "Caucasian race" clause; Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich.
614, 25 N.W. 2d 638 (1947), rev'd 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which upheld enforcement of racial
covenants against a Negro; Kemp v. Rubin, 180 N.Y. Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 680 (S.Ct.,
1948); Camp v. Recreation Board for District of Columbia, 104 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C., 1952).
69 E.g., Art. 147 of the Versailles Treaty imposed certain duties upon states prior to ratifi-
cation.
70 Hylton v. Brown, 12 Fed. Cas. 1123, No. 6,981 (D. Pa., 1806); United States v. Reynes,
9 How. (U.S.) 127 (1850); Davis v. Police jury of the Parish of Concordia, 9 How. (U.S.) 280
(1850); United States v. D'Auterive, 10 How. (U.S.) 609 (1850); Dooley v. United States,
182 U.S. 222 (1901); Beam v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 61 (1907); and MacLeod v. United
States, 45 Ct. Cl. 339 (1910), rev'd 229 U.S. 416 (1913).
71 "The ratification may be a form, but it is an essential form; for the instrument, in point
of legal efficacy, is imperfect without it.... [T]he ratification is the point from which the
treaty must take effect." The Eliza Ann, 1 Dod. 244, 248, 250 (High Court of Admiralty,
1813).
72In the Iloilo Claim, the American agent before the British-American Claims Commission
of 1910 argued, in reply to the British contention in favor of the retroactivity rule as announced
by United States courts, that such opinions should be ignored in the light of the "well-known
facts of international practice." The award of the commission sustained the American conten-
tion that retroactivity was contrary to international law. Nielsen's Report, American and
British Claims Arbitration 382 (1926).
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plied to treaties involving private rights,7 and that understandably so in view
of the customary "injunction to secrecy" over the handling of treaties prior to
their approval by the Senate. Substantially all modern treaties contain express
provisions on their effective date.
A reservation to a treaty usually takes the form of a declaration by a state, at
the time of signing, ratifying, or acceding to a treaty, that it is willing to be a
party to the treaty only on certain specified terms which will limit the treaty
insofar as it is concerned.7 4 When made at the time of signature75 there is fre-
quently an opportunity for the other states to adopt the reservation and thereby
make it general with respect to the treaty.76 Reservations made in the course of
ratification,7 7 i.e., by the Senate, present somewhat greater difficulties, espe-
cially in the case of multipartite treaties. Reservations by the Senate to bi-
lateral treaties may at times be "rather easily adjusted"7 by the two govern-
ments. In the case of multipartite treaties, however, it is necessary to bring the
reservations to the knowledge of all the other contracting states to secure their
approval.7 9 If some states have already ratified the treaty, their acceptance of
the reservations must somehow be secured. Hackworth admits that "failure to
object to reservations" may on some authority be regarded as acceptance, but
supports "the better view" that such failure should not be regarded as accept-
ance "in the absence of some act by the party which has already deposited its
ratification indicating that it regards the treaty as operative between it and the
party making the reservation.18 0 It is to avoid these difficulties that resort is
sometimes had to "understandings short of reservations" of varying effect and
significance, such as interpretative protocols, accompanying minutes, declara-
tions, exchanges of notes, and legislative reports.81 The principal importance of
such understandings for the private practitioner is their possible use in proceed-
ings before tribunals, particularly those of the government so stating its "under-
standing" of the treaty. Where the government of the forum did not participate
in the formulation of the "understanding," it is likely that it will have little or
no significance in a particular controversy.
Under Article 102 of the UN Charter "every treaty and every international
agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present
Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secre-
tariat and published by it." In the event of failure so to register, the Charter
73 Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 32 (1869). Also see United States v. De la Maza Arredon-
do, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 691 (1832), and Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921).
74 Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 843.
7- See art. 14 of the Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3.
76 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 107 (1943).
77 See art. 15 of the Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3.
78 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 113 (1943).
79 Ibid., at 130.
80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., at 144-53.
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provides that no party to an unregistered treaty "may invoke that treaty or
agreement before any organ of the United Nations."8 2 This requirement paral-
lels that of Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,83 which was
designed to abolish "secret diplomacy."84 In the Pablo Najero case, Mexico,
which was not at the time a member of the League of Nations, raised the ques-
tion of the effect of the failure to register the French-Mexican Claims Conven-
tion of 1924. The Claims Commission, sitting in its own cause as it were, ruled
that the failure to register the convention with the League Secretariat did not
affect the validity of the convention as between parties, but would preclude
them from invoking the treaty before any organ of the League or before an
international tribunal. 5 A similar conclusion was in effect reached by the Per-
manent Court of International Justice."'
III. THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
The function of interpreting treaties is shared between the executive, who
negotiated the treaty, and the courts, which enforce the treaty as "the supreme
law of the land." On occasion the courts have deferred to the'executive on the
ground that "the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment."87 It is the official position of the Department of State that:
2 Brandon, Analysis of the Terms "Treaty" and "International Agreement" for Purposes
of Registration under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, 47 Am. J. Int. L. 49 (1953).
That author argued against the making of a deliberate definition of the terms, preferring a
"gradual delimitation."
83 After 1925 the United States sent copies of its treaties to the Secretariat of the
League of Nations, which published them in its Treaty Series, and were regarded as "regis-
tered" from 1934 onward. 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 91 (1943). Generally see
a series of articles on the registration of treaties by Hudson in 19 Am. J. Int. L. 273 (1925); 22
ibid. 852 (1928); 24 ibid. 752 (1930); and 28 ibid. 342 (1934).
81 Writing prior to World War II, Hackworth said: "No secret treaty has been made by the
United States since 1790, when secret articles were concluded in a treaty with Creek Indians."
5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 87 (1943). The effect of provisions of the secret
agreements of World War II, and possible agreements of the "cold war" of the later period, can
of course not be determined so far as private property is concerned.
& Cited in 1 Schwarzenberger, International Law 176 (1945), who commented: "Yet in so
far as an international tribunal not connected with the League was concerned, it would create
an unjustifiable inequality of status between the parties if the Article [18 of the League
Covenant] could be invoked by the non-member State which itself was not bound by it." Ibid.
8 6 Ralston has pointed out that in delivering the judgment on August 30, 1924, in the
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court of International Justice
assumed that the Treaty of Lausanne was in force, although the instruments of the treaty
were not registered with the League of Nations at the time of judgment. They were registered
on September 5, 1924. Ralston, Supplement to the Law and Procedure of International
Tribunals 14 (1936).
Also see Hudson, Legal Effect of Unregistered Treaties in Practice, under Article 18 of the
Covenant, 28 Am. J. Int. L. 546 (1934).
87 "[Tihe question whether power remains in a foreign state to carry out its treaty obliga-
tions is in its nature political and not judicial and ... the courts ought not to interfere with the
conclusions of the political department in that regard." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288
(1902), where a citizen of one of the German states challenged the construction of the extra-
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Under the system of government of the United States, a final decision of questions
involving the interpretation of laws and treaties, from the standpoint of municipal
law, rests with the courts. 88
The courts, however, have accorded much weight to the construction of treaties
by the executive, especially to interpretative statements made at the time of the
negotiation of the treaty or in subsequent dealings with the other party to the
treaty."8 The judicial construction of a treaty by the courts of one country is of
course not controlling upon the courts of another country,9" as inconsistent with
the juridical equality of states."'
A great variety of maxims or canons of interpretation have been devised for
the purpose of devining the true meaning of a treaty. Most of them can be found
in Vattel's chapter (xvii) of Book 1. on "The Interpretation of Treaties," in
his The Law of Nations, and they still appear in modem dress although first pub-
lished in 1758.92 The practical use of these rules has frequently been called in
question by modern writers on international law, especially the late Professor
Hyde, who distrusted any interpretation by formula or preconceived rules or
dition treaty with the German Empire. Cf. Stoeck v. Public Trustee, [1921] 2 Ch. 67, 71, where
Mr. Justice Russel said that he did not appreciate the contention (by the Solicitor General)
that a court "should in the exercise of some discretion refrain from construing, an inter-
national document such as the Treaty of Peace."
88 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 267 (1943).
89 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921). Executive
instructions to consuls are entitled to the highest respect. Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13 (1875).
Also see United States v. Reid, 73 F. 2d 153 (C.A. 9th, 1934), cert. denied 299 U.S. 544
(1936). Compare The Yuu, 71 F. 2d 635 (C.A. 5th, 1934), where the executive interpretation
of the British-American treaty of 1924 was held inapplicable under the "most-favored-
nation" clause of the Honduran treaty of 1927.
10 McNair, The Law of Treaties 164 (1938). Secretary of State Hull specifically objected in
a communication to the British ambassador to the construction by English courts of the
phrase "contracting parties" under the Warsaw Convention as was made in Philippson v.
Imperial Airways, Ltd., [1939] A.C. 332. 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 199-200,
250-51 (1943).
91 British-American Arbitration Tribunal, In the Matter of David J. Adams (1921), 16
Am. J. Int. L. 315, 318 (1922).
9 "Fundamental among those rules is the one laid down by Vattel: 'It is not permissible
to interpret what has no need of interpretation.' Other rules more or less generally agreed
upon include those to the effect that usually the words of a treaty should be interpreted in the
sense which they would normally have in their context; that technical terms should be given
their technical meaning; that no word, phrase or clause in a treaty should be considered as
being without meaning, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary; that a treaty should
be considered as a whole and each of its parts in the light of all the others; that an interpre-
tation which would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result, or one which would render a
treaty inoperative, ineffective or nugatory should be avoided; that in cases of doubt, that inter-
pretation should be adopted which involves the minimum of obligation for the parties and
which is most favorable to the freedom and independence of States; that that interpretation
of a provision is to be preferred which is least to the advantage of the party for whose benefit
it was inserted in the treaty, or which is least onerous for the party making a concession."
The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 940.
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assumptions.93 Hyde championed the view that the purpose of interpretation is
to discover "the signification which the several parties to an agreement may be
regarded as having attached to their words," by using whatever means and evi-
dence seem most likely to serve that purpose.9 4 Plainly the interpretation of
treaties, like that of statutes, is not a mechanical task to be performed by the
routine application of maxims, whether phrased in Latin or English. In many
cases it will be found that not one but two or more maxims appear applicable,
with contradictory results, which of course settles nothing of importance with
respect to the text of the treaty, which may itself contain inconsistent provi-
sions.9 5 The criticism of canons and maxims tends to overstatements of its own,
and usually the critic evolves some canons of his own, such as the principle of
effectiveness, the importance of "legislative history," or some other factor.
The objective of treaty construction is normally to ascertain the intention of
the contracting states.9" Where no common intention existed, either because is-
sues were ignored by the parties, deliberately or otherwise, or because the inten-
tion was not common for all the parties, who continued to maintain their pre-
treaty views, there is not very much that the process of interpretation can sup-
ply under ordinary circumstances. What that situation requires is plainly a new
meeting of the minds of the contracting parties. It is of course possible, if the
interpreters are creatively daring, that the process of interpretation can accom-
plish such a further agreement.
Many opinions of the Supreme Court have contained language to the effect
that treaties "should receive a liberal interpretation," 97 or treaties should be
given "a liberal rather than a narrow interpretation," ' or that "where a treaty
admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed
under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred."99 The classic state-
93 For a summary of current views on the "canons," see The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 944 et seq.
94 Hyde, Concerning the Interpretation of Treaties, 3 Am. J. Int. L. 46, 47 (1909). Consult
also Yi-ting Chang, The Interpretation of Treaties by Judicial Tribunals (1933).
"Consult, Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in
the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 48, 52 (1949).
6 Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalU. (U.S.) 199 (1796); United States v. De la Maza Arredondo, 6
Pet. (U.S.) 691 (1832); and In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), which involved the exercise of
extraterritorial powers by an American consular court in Japan.
"A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose which it is intended to
serve. The historical background of the treaty, travaux preparatoires, the circumstances of the
parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to
be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, and
the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made, are to be considered in con-
nection with the general purpose which the treaty is intended to serve." Art. 19, The Law of
Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 937.
97 Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 454 (1930).
98 Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 128 (1928).
99 Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879). Also see Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258 (1890.); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); Nielsen v.
Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); and Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
19551 TREATY LAW
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
ment of the "liberal construction" of treaties is commonly found in Mr. Justice
Story's opinion in Shanks v. Dupont, wherein he said:
If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the other liberal;
one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; why should not the most
liberal exposition be adopted? °10
The competing canon is that of restrictive interpretation, which has equally
authoritative support in the cases. In Rocca v. Thompson the argument of "lib-
eral construction" in favor of the consular power was urged on behalf of the
Argentine consul, claiming priority under an 1853 treaty over the public admin-
istrator appointed under state law for the purpose of administration of a
decedent's estate, but Mr. Justice Day replied for the Court:
It is further to be observed that treaties are the subject of careful consideration before
they are entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express their meaning
and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes of the high contracting
parties. Had it been the intention to commit the administration of estates of citizens
of one country, dying in another, exclusively to the consul of the foreign nation, it
would have been very easy to have declared that purpose in unmistakable terms.101
Substantially the same question was decided the same way under the United
States-Swedish Convention of 1910 by Judge Cardozo, then of the New York
Court of Appeals. After referring to past refusals of the United States to grant
foreign consuls priority in the administration of estates, Cardozo said:
It is not to be lightly presumed that the government of the nation departed from the
precedents of a century, and by an obscure clause in a long and involved article of this
convention overturned its settled practice. 10
2
100 3 Pet. (U.S.) 242, 248 (1830). A similar view has been expressed by McNair: "There is
evidence that according to the British view treaties ought not to be construed in a pedantic
spirit and that in case of ambiguity they ought to receive a liberal construction." McNair,
The Law of Treaties 217 (1938).
The World Court has enunciated a somewhat comparable "rule of effectiveness" in a series
of cases. In the Chorzow Factory case it said: "[Alccount must be taken not only of the his-
torical development of arbitration treaties, as well as of the terminology of such treaties, and
of the grammatical and logical meaning of the words used, but also and more especially of the
function which,in the intention of the contracting Parties, is to be attributed to this provision."
Hambro, The Case Law of the International Court #50 (1952). In the Polish Nationality
case it said: "If this were not the case, the value and sphere of application of the Treaty would
be greatly diminished." Ibid., #6. But the World Court has also stressed the limitations on the
"rule of effectiveness" in its opinion on the Peace Treaties: "The principle of interpretation
expressed in the maxim: Ut res magis valeat quarn pereat, often referred to as the rule of effec-
tiveness, cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions for the settlement of disputes
in the Peace Treaties a meaning which, as stated above, would be contrary to their letter and
spirit." Ibid., #56. "International jurisprudence-and particularly that of the Permanent
Court of International justice and its successor-has constantly acted upon the principle of
effectiveness as the governing canon of interpretation." Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpreta-
tion and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 48,
68 (1949).
101223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912). Cf. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
102 Matter of D'Adamo, 212 N.Y. 214, 228, 106 N.E. 81, 86 (1914). Followed in Paperno v.
Michigan Railway Engineering Co., 202 Mich. 257, 168 N.W. 503 (1918), and in Lely v. Kali-
noglu, 76 F. 2d 983 (App. D.C., 1935).
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In fields falling peculiarly within the province of regulation by the states, as
distinguished from the federal government, a number of decisions, particularly
by state courts, have favored a restrictive interpretation of treaty provisions.
These cases have related primarily-to hunting and fishing,"'3 labor upon public
works, wrongful death statutes, the operation of motor busses, etc.1 4 There are
obviously limits, however, upon the extent to which federalism can affect the
interpretation of treaties. This was unequivocally pointed out by the Supreme
Court in Nielsen v. Johnson, where in dealing with a discriminatory state in-
heritance tax under the treaty with Denmark it said:
[A]nd as the treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the legislative
power of the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so construed is not restricted by
any necessity of avoiding possible conflict with state legislation, and when so ascer-
tained must prevail over inconsistent state enactments.105
Another duality in the interpretation of treaties is that between the reading
of words in their natural meaning and their reading in the light of "legislative
history." At first impression the "natural meaning" test is an obvious and just
one, and that is the way in which it is frequently approached by the judicial au-
thorities, particularly by the international tribunals which have a large propor-
tion of non-United States members.10° But in the absence of the background of
"legislative history," how can one be certain that the words are plain and clear?
The current answer of American courts to that question with respect to the
103 State regulation of fishing is not superseded by a treaty until the regulations under the
treaty are made effective. Ex parte Dove, 49 F. 2d 816 (D. Minn., 1925).
M See cases cited in 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 252 (1943). Also see Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). For an example of restrictive interpre-
tation of a treaty affecting real property, see Moody v. Hagen, 36 N.D. 471,490,162 N.W. 704,
709 (1917), aff'd 245 U.S. 633 (1917). On the wrongful death statutes, see Maiorano v. B. & 0.
R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 268 (1909), and, after a specific amendment of the Italian treaty, De Biasi v.
Normandy Water Co., 228 Fed. 234 (D. N.J., 1915).
10 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929).
101 For example, the World Court said in 1950 in its opinion on administrative questions in
the United Nations: "The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal
which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give
effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the
relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end
of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are
ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort
to other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties really did mean when
they used these words." Hambro, The Case Law of the International Court #43 (1952). To
the same import is the Court's decision in the Polish Postal Service in Danzig case, the Lotus
case, and the Lighthouse case. Ibid., ##40, 59, 68.
"[Iln no circumstances ought preparatory work to be excluded on the ground that the treaty
is clear in itself. Nothing is absolutely clear in itself. Most words and expressions have many
meanings. They have a general meaning, or a local one, or a meaning confined to a trade or
profession, or an arbitrary individual meaning specially selected to suit the requirements of the
parties .... It follows from what has been said that the statement that an expression is clear
is--or ought to be-the result of the process of interpretation, not the starting point." Lauter-
pacht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Treaties, 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 549, 571, 573 (1935).
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interpretation of statutes is in the negative, with the frequent use of background
materials.' The same answer should be expected in the case of treaties.'
Substantially all tribunals concur in the advisability of using "legislative his-
tory"-the somewhat stranger phrase "preparatory work" is more frequently
encountered in the law of treaties-as a guide to the proper interpretation of a
treaty.10 Even the English judges, who customarily abhor the use of "legislative
history" in the interpretation of acts of Parliament, have concurred in the use of
"preparatory work" in the interpretation of treaties."n
The term "preparatory work" has been defined by Lauterpacht, now the
British judge on the International Court of Justice, as involving two meanings:
(1) It may refer to the various written instruments emanating from or recording the
declarations of the views of the negotiators of the treaty. Such preparatory work in-
cludes the diplomatic correspondence by means of which the treaty is negotiated when
no special conference has been convened for the purpose. It includes, in other cases,
the negotiations preceding the conference; the original and successive drafts of the
treaty; negotiations at the conference and its committees as recorded in the minutes
or otherwise; the instructions issued to delegates. (2) It may refer to the expression of
opinion of Governments or authoritative members or committees of legislative bodies
during the process of obtaining parliamentary approval of the treaty."
These materials have not been used where they related to negotiations which
did not lead to an agreement between the negotiating states, as in the Charzow
Factory case."2 Nor can constructive use be made of "confidential" materials." 3
107 Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 Col. L. Rev. 957 (1940).
108The United States Supreme Court frequently looks to the preparatory work of a treaty
and has placed considerable weight thereon. See United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1 (1896);
Kinkhead v. United States, 150 U.S. 483 (1893); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923);
Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Todok v.
Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); and Factor
v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
109 One of the most eloquent cases for the use of "legislative history" in the process of inter-
preting treaties was made by Senator Elihu Root in his speech before the Senate on the Hay-
Pauncefort Treaty with respect to the exemption of American vessels from Panama Canal
tolls: "Treaties can not be usefully interpreted with the microscope and the dissecting knife
as if they were criminal indictments. Treaties are steps in the life and the development of
great nations. Public policies enter into them; public policies certified by public documents
and authentic expressions of public officers. Long contests betveen the representatives of
nations enter into the choice and arrangement of the words of a treaty. If you would be sure
of what a treaty means, if there be any doubt, if there are two interpretations suggested,
learn out of what conflicting public policies the words of the treaty had their birth; what
arguments were made for one side or the other, what concessions were yielded in the making
of a treaty." Quoted in 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 259 (1943).
no Mchair, The Law of Treaties 262 (1938).
m Lauterpacht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Treaties,
48 Harv. L. Rev. 549, 552 n. 3 (1935).
1 The Court said there that it could not "take account of declarations, admissions or pro-
posals which the Parties may have made in the course of direct negotiations" which have not
"led to an agreement between them." Hambro, The Case Law of the International Court
#52 (1952).
In The Ship Tom, 29 Ct. C1. 68 (1894), the Court of Claims declined to use a supplementary
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There are other limits to the use of preparatory work in the interpreta-
tion of treaties, as where there is a real conflict between the "clear" mean-
ing of the text of the treaty and the evidence of the preparatory work;1 4 or
where the preparatory work is in conflict with a long-continued judicial con-
struction of language used in treaties which the "treaty-making agencies have
not seen fit to alter."" 5
Multipartite "law-making" treaties may present a special problem for the use
of preparatory work as an aid of interpretation, according to Professor Quincy
Wright. In such cases the actual negotiation of the multipartite treaty is apt to
be the work of only a few of the important parties; the remarks at the conference
sessions are likely to be perfunctory; and the other acceding states "are usually
officially cognizant only of the text and formal reservations and can not be sup-
posed to have accepted interpretations suggested in the preliminary conversa-
tions of the original negotiators.""' The distinction between contracts and stat-
utes as drawn by Professor Wright has probably considerably less validity today
than when he wrote. But the tendency to stress the limitations on the use of
preparatory material in the construction of multipartite treaties has appeared
to many as "intrinsically reasonable.""17 Actual immersion in the legislative and
treaty-making processes from the standpoint of draftsmen has tended to make
the instant author also rather sceptical of the utility of much that passes for
"legislative history." He has been particularly concerned with the deliberate
tendency to place items in the legislative history, where they may be glossed
over without too much attention, whereas they probably would generate con-
troversy if explicitly spelled out in the statute or treaty. "Conscious" making
of "legislative history" is a real danger to beware of.
statement on the French spoliation claims that was appended to the 1800 treaty ten months
after its ratification. It is questionable whether this result would have been reached today in
view of the high regard ordinarily paid to executive construction of a treaty, whether occurring
at the time of the treaty or afterwards. In U.S.S.R. v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353
(S.D. N.Y., 1941), a federal district court held that the executive interpretation of an inter-
national agreement was binding on the courts insofar as it involved the rights of one inter-
national sovereign against another. That would appear to have been involved in The Ship
Tom, releasing a claim to the French.
U3 Danube Commission case. Hambro, The Case Law of the International Court #60
(1952).
n4 Chang, The Interpretation of Treaties by judicial Tribunals 49-51 (1933) referred to
the case of Asherberg Hopwood and Crew, Ltd. v. Quaritch before the Anglo-German Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal which tribunal apparently thought that "some mistake" had crept into the
preparatory work. While this case "stands almost by itself," it should be noted that in most
cases where the World Court has made use of preparatory work it has been "but merely...
to confirm the conclusions at which it had already arrived." The Law of Treaties, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 964.
"' Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947). A criticism of this decision is given in Meekison,
Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of Personal Property, 44 Am. J. Int. L. 313 (1950).
6 Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 Am. J. Int. L. 94, 104 (1929).
u7 McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 11 Brit. Y.B. Int. L.
100, 107 (1930).
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IV. Tim DURATION OF TREATIES
Treaties may come to an end in various ways."" The object of the treaty may
have been accomplished, and there is no longer any necessity for the treaty. The
treaty may have been made for a fixed period, following which it expires unless
renewed by some positive act. The parties to the treaty may specifically agree
to terminate a treaty by negotiating a new and different treaty covering sub-
stantially the same area or by agreeing to abrogate or dispense with the treaty
entirely."9 In most of these situations-except for the implied supersession of an
older treaty by a newer treaty without express provision-there is not apt to
arise any significant legal question of concern to the private practitioner. The
treaty either exists or it does not exist, and that is presumably the end of it,
save for the question of acquired rights.12 The difficulties arise where there is a
dispute whether a treaty remains in effect or not-whether an implied super-
session has taken place by a newer treaty,121 whether there has occurred some
significant change in circumstances that renders performance under the treaty
either impossible or specially onerous, whether there is an implied termination
by notice.122 The view of the executive on abrogation is ordinarily not chal-
lenged."23
Among the instances of implied supersession of United States treaties are the
Prussian Treaty of 1799 (with its provisions against the confiscation of private
property in the event of war) by the Peace Treaty with Germany in 1921;124 the
uS "Article 33. Termination of Treaties
"(a) A treaty or any provision thereof may be terminated by agreement of the parties.
"(b) A treaty to which only two States are parties is terminated when one of the parties
becomes extinct.
"(c) Subject to any provision concerning its renewal or continuance contained in the treaty
or agreed by the parties, a treaty concluded for a fixed period of time is terminated by the ex-
piration of that period.
"(d) The termination of a treaty puts an end to all executory obligations stiuplated in the
treaty; it does not affect the validity of rights acquired in consequence of the performance
of obligations stipulated in the treaty." The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1161,
1171.
n
9 See examples given in 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 301-18 (1943). Note
that some treaties, e.g., Art. 103 of the United Nations Charter, provide that no subsequent
inconsistent treaty may be concluded. A similar provision can be found in Art. 20 of the
League of Nations Covenant.
120 In Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (U.S.) 259 (1817), the Supreme Court held that the
termination of the French treaty, which provided for the right of French citizens to acquire
and hold land in the United States, did not affect the title to land acquired by French citizens
prior to the termination of the treaty. Accord: Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d
53, 195 P. 2d 1 (1948).
1' The implied repeal of a treaty by a later statute is not favored in construction. United
States v. Domestic Fuel Corp., 71 F. 2d 424 (Cust. & Pat. App., 1934).
122 This article is not concerned with the effect of governmental or territorial changes upon
treaties.
23 Anchor Line, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 280 Fed. 870 (S.D. N.Y., 1921).
124 Junkers v. Chemical Foundation, 287 Fed. 597 (S.D. N.Y., 1922), in which a German
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1830 treaty of commerce and navigation with the Ottoman Empire by the 1931
treaty of establishment and sojourn with Turkey; 125 and the 1869 treaty with
France on industrial property by the treaty of 1883.126 Under the doctrine of
implied supersession the treaty of a later date prevails over an earlier treaty
between the same parties.
127
The doctrine of rebus sic slantibus in its application to treaty law128 is very
national was not permitted to sue the Alien Property Custodian for the seizure of patents.
This may be dictum, for the result could be justified under specific treaty provisions without
raising the question of implied supersession.
"2 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 306-7 (1943).
126La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 57 Fed. 37 (S.D. N.Y., 1893).
12 "First, the principle lex posterior derogat priori is applicable to treaty law if the following
five requirements are met:
(1) if the later treaty covers the same subject as the earlier treaty;
(2) if the later treaty involves the same parties as the earlier treaty;
(3) if the later treaty is of the sane level as or of a higher level than the earlier treaty;
(4) if the scope of the later treaty is of the same degree of generality as the earlier treaty;
(5) if the legal effect or effects provided for in the later treaty is or are different from that
of the earlier treaty.
"Second, if these five requirements are met the earlier treaty is voidable to the extent that
it is incompatible with the later treaty.
"Third, if one or more of the above five requirements are met only in part, the extent to
which the earlier treaty is superseded by the later treaty is to be determined by way of inter-
pretation. It may be controversial, in particular:
(1) whether and to what extent a later treaty concluded by two or more parties to a mul-
tilateral treaty without consent of all the original parties is valid;
(2) whether and to what extent a treaty of the higher level prevails over a treaty of the
lower level, e.g., the United Nations Charter over arrangements inter se of the members of the
United Nations;
(3) whether and to what extent a later treaty whose scope is less general than the original
treaty (lex specialis) conflicts with an earlier treaty which is broader in scope;
(4) whether, in case a treaty is declared voidable by the appropriate organ or organs of the
community of nations or by appropriate domestic agencies on the ground that it is at variance
with a later treaty, such a treaty becomes invalid ex nunc, i.e., from the time it has been de-
dared invalid; or whether it becomes invalid ex tune, i.e., from the date it entered into force."
Aufricht, Supersession of Treaties in International Law, 37 Cornell L.Q. 655, 700 (1952).
128 Generally see Hill, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law (1934),
and Bullington, International Treaties and the Clause "Rebus Sic Stantibus," 76 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 153 (1927).
"Article 28. REBUS SIC STANTIBUS
"(a) A treaty entered into with reference to the existence of a state of facts the continued
existence of which was envisaged by the parties as a determining factor moving them to
undertake the obligations stipulated, may be declared by a competent international tribunal
or authority to have ceased to be binding, in the sense of calling for further performance, when
that state of facts has been essentially changed.
"(b) Pending agreement by the parties upon and decision by a competent international
tribunal or authority, the party which seeks such a declaration may provisionally suspend
performance of its obligations under the treaty.
"(c) A provisional suspension of performance by the party seeking such a declaration will
not be justified definitively until a decision to this effect has been rendered by the competent
international tribunal or authority." The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1096.
The application of rebus sic stantibus to political treaties has been denounced as a per-
nicious doctrine by Professor Jessup. "In such situations it would amount to the proposition
that no peace treaty accepted by a defeated state remains valid after that state recovers
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controversial. This doctrine is essentially that a treaty may cease to be binding
because of some change in the state of facts which existed or were envisaged by
the parties at the time they entered into the treaty. The facts should normally
be "essential" or "vital." That does not always appear to be required, but it is
important that the consequences of the changes of fact should be substantial,
i.e., resulting in injury or burden. Some of the disfavor in which the doctrine has
been held was undoubtedly due to the arguments of Hitler for the unilateral
revision of the "Versailles Dictate." But with the coming of World War II, the
doctrine was given some respectability by being invoked by the governments of
both the United Kingdom (together with the Commonwealth and France)'2 9
and the United States. 13° The doctrine was used by name by the United States
Court of Claims in its decision on the fourth French Spoliation Case in Hooper v.
Unzited States"' in justifying under international law, as distinguished from the
constitutional law of the United States,"' the congressional abrogation in 1798
of the treaty with France of 1778, among other justifications. Technically, this
was obiter.
No international tribunal has so far recognized the doctrine as sufficiently
excusing performance under a treaty. The World Court has on occasion ap-
proached the doctrine, only quickly to back away from it as a necessary part of
sufficiently or the victors weaken sufficiently to make it politically possible for the defeated
state to throw off the burden without danger of another defeat. No more unsettling legal prin-
ciple could be imagined; but it would in fact, if accepted, reflect what has frequently occurred."
Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations 150-51 (1948).
,9 The United Kingdom served notice that as a result of its declaration of war upon Ger-
many it would no longer agree that its earlier acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
World Court would be regarded as operative so far as events connected with World War II
were concerned. 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 350 (1943). See also McNair, The
Law of Treaties, 376-77 (1938).
110 When the United States government in 1941 chose to relieve itself of the requirements of
the International Load Line Convention of 1930, the justification of the Presidential Proclama-
tion was "changed conditions." 6 Fed. Reg. 399 (1941). The accompanying opinion of the
Attorney General specifically referred to rebus sic stantibus as "a well-established principle of
international law" according to which "a treaty ceases to be binding when the basic condi-
tions [i.e., normal peacetime international trade] upon which it was founded have essentially
changed." 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 119, 121 (1941). See the vigorous criticism by Briggs, The
Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantitns, 36 Am. J. Int. L. 89 (1942).
1"122 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887). The court said: "A treaty which on its face is of indefinite duration
and which contains no clause providing for its termination may be annulled by one of the
parties under certain circumstances. As between the nations it is in its nature a contract, and
if the consideration fail, for example, or if its important provisions be broken by one party, the
other may, at its option, declare it terminated.... Abrogation of a treaty may occur by
change of circumstances [citing Wharton on rebus sic stantibus] .... The treaties had served
their purpose; the conditions which they contemplated had changed. Whatever may have been
the justice of French complaints of our course with Great Britain, and whatever may have
been her rights under the circumstances, still she had so invaded the rights of the United
States to free commerce in innocent cargoes upon the high seas, that a case was presented of
such failure of consideration, and of such active infraction of the treaties, that this country
was in a position to proclaim them ended." Ibid., at 416, 417, 425.
12 The Court of Claims pointed out that the Supreme Court had already decided as a matter
of domestic law that the subsequent Act of Congress in 1798 had lawfully abrogated the French
treaty of 1778 in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (U.S.) 259 (1817).
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its decision."' Nor has the related doctrine of "force majeure" been recog-
nized.3 4 The United Nations Charter does not contain any provision looking to
the inapplicability of treaties as was found in the League Covenant." 5
Commercial treaties frequently provide for their termination or for the with-
drawal of one party (in the case of a multipartite treaty) upon the giving of
prescribed notice.1'" The exercise of a right of termination is occasionally neces-
sitated by changes in the domestic law of one of the contracting parties; or it
may be exercised to "cut some dead wood out of the treaty forest. 1 7 judge
McNair, having regard for the "facility with which changes can now occur in
the course of trade," has suggested that in the case of commercial treaties there
ought to be a special rule entitling any party to an "implied right of denuncia-
tion upon giving reasonable notice." This right should be inferred "from the
very nature of the treaty on the ground that it requires revision from time to
time in order to bring it into harmony with changing conditions." 1 8 But neither
McNair's government-the British-nor the United States authorities have
accepted this view.
V. THE EFFECT OF WAR UPON PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER TREATIES
The effect of the outbreak of war or hostilities upon existing treaties between
or affecting the warring countries is a subject on which there is "a great con-
"' See the cases of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, and the Nation-
ality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco. Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1106-10,
1114-15.
1'4 Turkey endeavored to rely on "force majeure"-not "duress" at the time of the treaty-
in its dispute before the Permanent Court of Arbitration with Russia over the payment of
moratory interest on indemnities under the 1879 treaty. The Russian govermnent in its
argument before the court conceded that a state could escape a treaty obligation "if the
very existence of the State should be in danger." But the Hague court found that "it would
clearly be exaggeration to admit that the payment (or obtaining of a loan for the repayment)
of the comparatively small sum of about six million francs due the Russian claimants would
imperil the existence of the Ottoman Empire or seriously compromise its internal or external
situation. The exception of force inajeure can not, therefore, be admitted." Scott, Hague Court
Reports 297, 318 (1916).
In the Serbian Loans case, the government of Yugoslavia made a similar argument
before the World Court to escape liability for pre-World War I loans, but the Court responded:
"It cannot be maintained that the war itself, despite its grave economic consequences, affected
the legal obligations of the contracts between the Serbian Government and the French bond-
holders. The economic dislocations caused by the war did not release the debtor State,
although they may present equities which doubtless will receive appropriate consideration in
the negotiations and-if resorted to-the arbitral determination for which Article II of the
Special Agreement provides." Cited in 1 Schwarzenberger, International Law 184 (1945).
1 Art. 19 authorized the Assembly of the League of Nations to "advise the reconsideration
by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable...."
16 For an example of the possible ambiguity in applying the notice provision see the dis-
cussions of the United States and Japan in 1908 with respect to the 1894 treaty of com-
merce and navigation, which resulted eventually in a new treaty in 1911. 5 Hackworth,
Digest of International Law 307-9 (1943).
1"7 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 312-13 (1943). For example Great Britain in
1922 denounced its 1862 treaty for the suppression of the African slave trade. Ibid.
"3 McNair, The Law of Treaties 367 (1938).
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trariety of views. The law of the subject is still in the making .... "1"9 The court
on behalf of which these words were spoken added to the "great contrariety" in
that very case. 140 The resulting uncertainty over the effect of war upon the
status of treaties, generally or with regard to particular provisions, or as they
may be applied in special cases, has naturally affected the enjoyment of private
rights in connection with the ownership of property, the processes of inherit-
ance, the conduct of litigation, and the operation of rights in patents, trade-
marks, and copyrights. 14 With the ending of hostilities and the coming of peace
settlements, some of the uncertainty may be eliminated by specific provisions in
the new treaties which may go far in determining what part, if any, of the old
treaties should still be considered in effect. In the interval-which may be no
short period in view of the complex political and other factors in negotiating a
peace settlement with the defeated enemy-the best test for the guidance of
private action remains the compatibility test of Techt v. Hughes'4 and Clark v.
Allen. 41 Under these cases it is not perhaps so much the outbreak of war as the
treaty of peace that may give the final clue to whether a particular treaty is
abrogated or not.
44
139 Mr. Justice Sutherland in Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231,236 (1929). The Court
held that the right "freely to pass" across the Canadian border under the Jay Treaty of 1794
had been "brought to an end by the War of 1812." Ibid., at 241. Professor Borchard has
pointed out that the abrogation of this particular provision of the Jay Treaty was strongly
supported by executive opinion and that if the provision had been adjudged to remain in force
it would have conflicted with immigration policy. 26 Am. J. Int. L. 585 (1932). The Karuth
case has, however, been severely criticized: "This decision is to be regretted; it cannot be de-
fended in the light of practice and jurisprudence." Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at
1187. It has been defended by Lenoir, The Effect.of War on Bilateral Treaties, with Special
Reference to Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions, 34 Geo. L.J. 129, 155 (1946).
140 It took the Court more than a century to discover that the War of 1812 had had this
effect upon the Jay Treaty. In 1823 the Court had ruled that the War of 1812 had no effect
upon the property provisions of the Jay Treaty. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v.
New Haven, 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 464 (1823). And a later, if inferior, court has ruled that the
identical provision of the Jay Treaty on the right "freely to pass" the Canadian border survived
in the case of Indians, even if it had been abrogated by the War of 1812 under the Supreme
Court's decision! United States v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. N.Y., 1947), which dis-
tinguished its decision by stressing the specific reference to the rights of Indians in the Treaty
of Ghent.
141 Mr. Justice Sutherland enumerated the following treaty obligations as remaining in
force during war: "stipulations in respect of what shall be done in a state of war; treaties of
cession, boundary, and the like; provisions giving the right to citizens or subjects of one of the
high contracting powers to continue to hold and transmit land in the territory of the other;
and, generally, provisions which represent completed acts." Karnuth v. United States, 279
U.S. 231, 236 (1929). The treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan was regarded as
suspended during the war. Ex parte Zenzo Arakawa, 79 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa., 1947).
1 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920). 143 31 U.S. 503 (1947).
144 "War, in the first place, is no more than a circumstance which, in certain cases, justifies
the denunciation of treaties. The determination of when such justification exists is a ques-
tion of international law. War in itself possesses no inherent characteristic that requires an
automatic and generally abrogative effect on treaties. Treaties remain in force unless they are
denounced or are terminated pursuant to an express or implied provision in the treaty itself.
Those treaties that provide that a party may denounce it if war breaks out indicate that it is
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The older view of international law was that war ipso facto abrogated all
treaties between the warring enemies.145 Abrogation is still the rule for treaties
of political alliance for the obvious reason that the very basis of the alliance is
destroyed by the outbreak of hostilities among the late allies. Abrogation is ob-
viously not the rule for treaties which specifically envisaged the possibility of
war and provided for its conduct and effect, e.g., the Hague and Geneva regula-
tions.' One of the earliest of the United States treaties, that with Prussia in
1799, contained a specific provision on the property rights of merchants of either
country residing in the other "if war should arise between the two contracting
parties."14 7 An extraordinary example among the great powers of nineteenth-
century Europe was the continued payments made by the United Kingdom on
the Russo-Dutch Loan of 1815, even during the Crimean War, in accord with the
express terms of the treaty that the servicing of the loan was not to be affected
by war between the parties.14 8 The determining factor is "the intent of the high
contracting parties as expressed in the treaty,'' 49 so far as it can be ascer-
tained.15 0
At a very early date the courts of the United States had to deal with the
question of private rights under treaties with countries at war with the United
States. The leading case of this period is Society for the Propagation of te Gospel
v. New Haven,' which upheld the right of a British corporation to claim pro-
the parties themselves and not war, as such, that terminates treaties.... It is therefore sub-
mitted that the terminating factor of bilateral treaties in the second World War has not been
li war, but the will or intention of the victorious powers as expressed in the peace treaties.
In other words, bilateral treaties between the belligerents were terminated ex nunc, i.e., from
the time of conclusion of the peace treaty, and not ex tunc, i.e., from the time of the outbreak
of the war, and it has no retroactive effect. The parties of course could have provided for
retroactivity, but this again would be a manifestation of intention and not a result of war."
Rank, Modem War and the Validity of Treaties, 38 Cornell L.Q. 321, 328, 538 (1953).
145 For the views of the older writers, see The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1184-
85. This complete abrogation point of view is apparently still adhered to by the French and
possibly by some German courts. Rank, Modem War and the Validity of Treaties, 38 Cornell
L.Q. 321 (1953).
1"6 Art. 142 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 specifically provides that a denunciation by
a party at war shall not take effect until the conclusion of peace.
147 2 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements 1486,
1494 (1910). In 1917 President Wilson stated that this treaty had been made "for war, not
for peace" and was accordingly binding upon the United States after it became involved in
World War I. 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 383-84 (1943).
The seizure of German assets under the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act was recognized as
valid by the German government under Art. 297 of the Versailles Treaty. See Munich Re-
insurance Co. v. First Reinsurance Co., 6 F. 2d 742 (C.A. 2d, 1925).
The treaty with Prussia of 1828 was held to remain in force 1919-21 in The Sophie Rick-
mers, 45 F. 2d 413 (S.D. N.Y., 1930), resulting in the application of a lower tonnage duty. See
Borchard, The Effect of War on the Treaty of 1828 with Prussia, 26 Am. J. Int. L. 582 (1932).
148 The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1191.
.49 Allen v. Markham, 156 F. 2d 653, 661 (C.A. 9th, 1946), aff'd in part 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
15D For example, see the International Civil Aviation Convention of 1944, TIAS 1591, p. 31.
1 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 464 (1823).
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tection against seizure during war (of 1812) as specifically provided under the
Jay Treaty. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Washington said:
There may be treaties of such a nature, as to their object and import, as that war will
put an end to them; but where treaties contemplate a permanent arrangement of
territorial, and other national rights, or which, in their terms are meant to provide
for the event of an intervening war, it would be against every principle of just inter-
pretation, to hold them extinguished by the event of war.... We think, therefore,
that treaties stipulating for permanent rights, and general arrangements, and pro-
fessing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as well as of peace, do
not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only suspended while it lasts; and
unless they are waived by the parties, or new and repugnant stipulations are made,
they revive in their operation at the return of peace.
152
This trend away from the rule of complete abrogation has been characterized
as:
a necessary corollary of the increasing interdependence of States, the establishment of
a vast network of treaty-relationships and a dearer appreciation of the general in-
convenience of a practice which would result in the complete upsetting, under modem
conditions, of those relationships."'
Has this tendency been counterbalanced by the advent of "total war"? 15 4
A more articulate formulation of this view was given by Judge Cardozo, then
a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, in the bench-mark case of Techi v.
Hughes,"' in the form of the "compatibility" test for determining whether a
given treaty, or some particular provision thereof, is to be regarded by the
courts in a matter affecting private rights as in effect between countries engaged
in hostilities with one another, in the absence of a declaration by the political
arm of the government. The specific facts of the case made it a hard one to de-
cide, for the claimant under the treaty was an American citizen who had lost her
citizenship through marriage with an alien, but was an actual resident of the
state of New York. The judicial result, however, was not a hard case making
bad law, for the resulting opinion is one of the great American contributions to
international law. The specific question was whether the Austrian Treaty of
1848, under which Austrian nationals were given the right to inherit land in the
United States, had survived the outbreak of World War I between the United
States and Austria-Hungary. In concluding that the treaty with Austria was
still applicable to the inheritance of land in New York by an Austrian national,
Judge Cardozo said:
The question is not what states may do after war has supervened, and this without
breach of their duty as members of the society of nations. The question is what courts
12 Ibid., at 494. The English Court of Chancery reached substantially the same con-
clusion with respect to the rights of Americans under the same treaty to own land in London.
Sutton v. Sutton, [1830] 1 Russ. & M. 663.
'5'The Law of Treaties, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1185.
'4""What is meantiby total war is greater intensity in warfare and the use of more de-
veloped means of destruction. It does not and should not necessarily mean obliteration of all
legal relations between belligerents." Rank, op. cit. supra note 145, at 322.
1- 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920).
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are to presume that they have done... while war is still flagrant, and the will of the
political departments of the government unrevealed,15 6 the courts, as I view their
function, play a humbler and more cautious part. It is not for them to denounce trea-
ties generally, en bloc. Their part it is, as one provision or another is involved in some
actual controversy before them, to determine whether, alone, or by force of connection
with an inseparable scheme, the provision is inconsistent with the policy or safety of
the nation in the emergency of war, and hence presumably intended to be limited to
times of peace....
I find nothing incompatible with the policy of the government, with the safety of
the nation, or with the maintenance of the war in the enforcement of this treaty so as
to sustain the plaintiff's title. We do not confiscate the lands or goods of the stranger
within our gates. If we permit him to remain, he is free during good behavior to buy
property and sell it .... A public policy not outraged by purchase will not be outraged
by inheritance.15
The "compatibility" test was specifically adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court in Clark v. Allen158 as the "correct" view, and was somewhat broad-
ened. What is compared is no longer the state of hostilities so much as the
national policy of the United States in relationship to the particular rights and
duties under the particular treaty in the event of war. This case applied the
treaty to the right of alien enemies to inherit and did not involve, as in Techt v.
Hughes, the rights of a resident alien. A new factor was, of course, the Trading-
with-the-Enemy Act, under which the Alien Property Custodian had vested the
estate inherited by the alien enemies. Mr. justice Douglas said for the Court:
Where the relevant historical sources and the instrument itself give no plain indication
that it is to become inoperative in whole or in part on the outbreak of war, we are left
to determine, as Techt v. Hughes, supra, indicates, whether the provision under which
rights are asserted is incompatible with national policy in time of war."8 9
The Supreme Court decided that it was not.'
The peace settlements of World Wars I and II contained specific provisions
for the revival of bilateral treaties among the defeated enemy states and the al-
lied powers through a procedure of notification. Within six months the individ-
156 This language seems to imply that if the case had arisen subsequent to the notification
of revived treaties, infra, Techt v. Hughes might have been differently decided by the New
York Court of Appeals, since the particular treaty was not listed among the treaties revived by
the United States in 1922. It should be noted that in 1918, Secretary of State Lansing had
said that the Department did not regard those provisions (for inheritance of property) as
then in operation. 6 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 327 (1943).
15 Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 242, 243, 244, 128 N.E. 185, 192 (1920). Accord: In re
Flaum's Estate, 180 N.Y. Misc. 1025, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 539 (Surr. Ct., 1943), where it was held
that the invasion and occupation of Poland by Germany did not suspend the United States-
Polish Treaty. Compare In re Ramberg's Estate, 174 N.Y. Misc. 306, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 619 (Surr.
Ct., 1940), where it was held that the freezing of Norwegian assets upon the German invasion
of Norway led to the abrogation of the 1932 treaty with Norway on inheritance.
-8 331 U.S. 503 (1947). Accord: Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal. 2d 573, 191 P. 2d 747 (1948);
Blank v. Clark, 79 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa., 1948).
19 331 U.S., at 513.
160 The distinction drawn by the Court between personal property and real property has
been criticized. See note 115 supra.
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ual allied powers were unilaterally to notify the defeated state which specific
treaties should be revived or kept in force.161 The provision of the Italian Peace
Treaty of 1947 may be regarded as typical of the newer peace treaties:
1. Each Allied or Associated Powerwill notify Italy, within a period of six months
from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which of its pre-war bilateral treaties
with Italy it desires to keep in force or revive. Any provisions not in conformity with
the present Treaty shall, however, be deleted from the above-mentioned treaties.
2. All such treaties so notified shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United
Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. All such treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated. 162
The notifications submitted by the United States after World War I were
extremely limited in number, including only a 1909 patent agreement with
Germany, an 1856 extradition convention with Austria and Hungary, and a
1912 copyright convention with Hungary. All other bilateral treaties of the
United States with Germany, Austria, and Hungary were deemed by the De-
partment of State to have been automatically abrogated.'6'
The courts, however, did not agree. The leading case is State v. Reardon6 4
where the court held that the failure to include in the notification of Germany
the 1828 treaty with Prussia, which provided for reciprocal privileges of in-
heritance, did not result in the legal abrogation of the omitted treaty, which
otherwise satisfied the "compatibility" test of Judge Cardozo. The notifications
after World War II have been far more extensive.165
161 Consult Art. 289 of the Versailles Treaty (Germany), Art. 241 of the Treaty of Saint-
Germain (Austria), and Art. 224 of the Treaty of Trianon (Austria) for the settlements of
World War I. No provisions were made for multipartite treaties.
162 Art. 44, 61 Stat. 1386 (1947). Similar provisions are found in Art. 8 of the Bulgarian
Treaty, 61 Stat. 1956 (1947); Art. 10 of the Hungarian Treaty, 61 Stat. 2115 (1947); Art. 10
of the Rumanian Treaty, 61 Stat. 1803 (1947); and Art. 7 of the Japanese Treaty.
1635 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 388 (1943).
164 120 Kan. 614, 245 P. 158 (1926). The court said: "Considered by itself the provision that
each of the allied or associated powers shall notify to Germany the treaties which it wishes to
revive may readily be interpreted as not applying to any treaty or part of a treaty which was
not suspended or annulled by the war, since there is no occasion to revive a treaty or part of
which which has remained continuously in force....
"It seems obvious that there was no intention of absolutely wiping out all former treaties
between the United States and Germany. There was necessarily an implied exception in favor
of those entered into to establish a permanent status, such as one settling a boundary dispute.
Nor can it have been intended to divest property rights that had already vested under existing
treaties. The question to be determined is whether the same considerations which are held to
warrant classifying treaty provisions granting a reciprocal privilege of inheritance with those
which are not affected by the war, may not also warrant classifying them with those that
were not intended to be nullified by the failure to have them formally revived after the war."
Ibid., at 618-19, 160. Accord: Estate of Meyer, 107 Cal. App. 2d 799, 238 P. 2d 597 (1951);
Hempel v. Weedin, 23 F. 2d 949 (W.D. Wash., 1928); Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750, 223 N.W.
13 (1929). See generally Lesser, Treaty Provisions Dealing with the Status of Pre-War Bi-
lateral Treaties, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 573 (1953).
165The Italian government was notified on February 6, 1948, that the United States de-
sired to keep in force or revive the treaties concerning arbitration (1928), air navigation
(1931), advancement of peace (1914), consular matters (1878), debt funding (1925), extradi-
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VI. SOURCES FOR FINDING TREATY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
There is no single source for finding all the treaties and international agree-
ments of the United States. Nor is it possible to determine the present status
and significance of a given treaty from any authoritative single source. Nor is
there any ready and reliable means of finding court decisions involving treaties
and agreements. The publication of treaties and international agreements by the
government of the United States has been characterized by fitful starts and
stops, with a resulting series of discontinuities that must be the despair of any
serious user. There has always been a substantial time lag between the ratifica-
tion of a treaty and its publication in some source more accessible (and digni-
fied) than a mimeographed press release of the Department of State. Par-
simonious appropriations explain much of the difficulty, especially the discon-
tinued series of publications. But the abandonment of the century-old practice
of printing treaties and executive agreements among the Statutes at Large of the
United States has certainly not simplified the task of the user of treaty law.66
Up until 1950, all treaties, and between 1931 and 1949 inclusive, all executive
agreements with foreign governments, were published in the Statutes at Large.
Since 1950, the official source of publication is a new publication entitled Treaties
and Other International Agreements, whose physical appearance is admittedly
more attractive although less impressive as "law," and considerably more cum-
bersome for citation purposes. That change in publication has played havoc
with the various "statutes construed" tables of the digests, which have hitherto
been a useful source for finding the case construction or citation of a given
treaty, but this difficulty is probably temporary. For the last several years
(since 1951) it has been idle to rely on the extremely useful publication of the
Department of State entitled Treaty Developments, for its loose-leaf distribution
tion (1868), traffic in narcotic drugs (1928), reciprocal recognition of certificates of inspection
of vessels (1931), passport visa fees (1929), postal communications (1877, 1929), relief from
double tax on shipping profits (1926), and reciprocal protection of trademarks (1882). 3
United States Treaty Developments, Appendix Mll (A) 6 (1948). On April 12, 1953, the
notification to Japan included the treaties relating to extradition (1886, 1906), narcotic drugs
(1928-29), postal (1885, 1888, 1889, 1904, 1938), property leaseholds (1937), smuggling of
intoxicating liquors (1930), and reciprocal exemption from taxation. Ibid. The Department of
State considers all pre-war treaties with Austria to be still in force. Letter of Charles I. Bevans,
cited in Rank, op. cit. supra note 145, at 344. The situation with respect to the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany has been characterized as an "admixture of revival in toto, partial revalidation,
or supersession in whole or in part." Plischke, Reactivation of Prewar German Treaties, 48
Am. J. Int. L. 245, 261 (1954). The Department of State has taken action under the provisions
of Directive No. 6 of the Allied Commission, entitled "Treaties Concluded by the Former
German Reich," to notify the Federal Republic of its desire to have four treaties "placed in
effect" between it and the United States, namely: the 1907 Convention relating to force in the
recovery of contract debts, the Brussels Convention of 1910 on salvage, the Brussels Conven-
tion of 1924 on bills of lading, and the Warsaw Convention of 1929. Letter of Charles I. Bevans,
cited in Rank, op. cit. supra note 145, at 344, 345.
1'6It is an interesting psychological speculation (suggested to the author by Harry Leroy
Jones) whether the dropping out of treaties from the Statutes at Large in 1950 may not lea
many lawyers, who have little contact with international law, to regard treaties as less of the
part of law than formerly when they were printed as "Stats."
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has not been made since 1952, covering the year 1950. In 1948, the scholarly
publication of treaties (through July 1, 1863) with their background notes by
Miller was discontinued, with little hope of revival.
The way of the legal practitioner in finding his treaty, diplomatic applica-
tions, and judicial interpretations, will needs be along the following diverse and
uncertain paths:
1. Press releases by the Department of State (mimeographed). The first official
reference to a treaty or agreement is likely to take the form of a press release of
the Department of State, which may or may not contain the verbatim text.
The release may be issued at the time of signing by a representative of the
United States, or in conjunction with the submission of a treaty to the Senate
for its approval, or after Senate publication. There is a distinct trend away from
the traditional "injunction of secrecy" of Senate consideration of the treaty,
particularly in the case of multipartite treaties (where the text is widely known),
or treaties of which there is a public demand for the text, as in the case of bi-
partite commercial or tax treaties.
2. Department of State Bulletin publication. A month or so later the press
release will usually be picked up in the monthly Bulletin of the Department of
State, which may or may not give as much detail as the original press release.
If the supply of the press release continues to be adequate, copies may be sent
in response to inquiries by practitioners. Otherwise they will have to wait for
publication in the TIAS series (3 below), which usually takes six months or more.
3. TIAS, TS, and EAS. Starting on December 27, 1945, the Department of
State has published treaties and international agreements, upon their proclama-
tion, in the form of "slip laws," known as Treaties and Other International
Acts Series (TIAS). This series was inaugurated to make available in a single
"slip" series the English and foreign texts of treaties and other instruments
(e.g., charters of international organizations, declarations, agreements effected
by exchange of notes, etc.) that establish or define relations between the United
States and other countries. TIAS started with the number 1501, which was
determined by adding 994 of TS and 506 of EAS, its predecessors. The Treaty
Series (TS) began as "slip laws" in 1908 with the number 489 (to take account
of preceding treaties which had been published in the Statutes at Large),
and the Executive Agreement Series (EAS) began in October, 1929, and ran
through March 16, 1945. Sometimes, however, the old TS had included execu-
tive agreements, which were indicated by the addition of "A" or " " to the
TS number. A numerical listing of all three series was given, up through 1950,
in Appendix II of Treaty Developments. Unofficial printings of TIAS are occa-
sionally given in the United States Code Congressional & Administrative News,
while the tax treaties are usually given in Tax Treaties by Commerce Clearing
House.
4. Statutes at Large (up to 1950). Treaties and major executive agreements
were published in the Statutes at Large through Volume 64, when that source of
publication ceased. Part 3 of Volume 64 contains a cumulative "List of Treaties
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and Other International Agreements Contained in the United States Statutes
at Large," pages B 1107-82, arranged alphabetically by country and, within
each country, alphabetically by subject. No notation is given as to whether a
particular text was in effect in 1950.
5. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST). Under
a 1950 amendment to Ch. 2, Title 1 of the United States Code, adding § 112a,
the Secretary of State was directed to compile, edit, index, and publish a com-
pilation to be entitled "United States Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments." This new compilation
shall contain all treaties to which the United States is a party that have been pro-
claimed during each calendar year, and all international agreements other than treaties
to which the United States is a party that have been signed, proclaimed, or with refer-
ence to which any other final formality has been executed, during each calendar year. 67
This compilation is "legal evidence... in all the courts of the United States,
the several States, and the Territories and insular possessions of the United
States." The compilation is arranged in the numerical order of TIAS. The cus-
tomary citation suggested is UST. Publication is currently running more than
two years behind "slip" law publication. s8
6. Collections of United States Treaties and International Agreements. The
classic source for older treaties (prior to 1937) is the four-volume Malloy, Treaties,
Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United
States of America and Other Powers, commonly cited as "Malloy."''  It gives
only the English text and no background comment. For the period between
July 1, 1863, and 1937, Malloy is the only source of a comprehensive collection
of treaties and international agreements. For the period prior to July 1, 1863,
the authoritative collection is Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the
United States, which has been unfortunately discontinued. Miller gives the for-
eign text and a great deal of the official background of the particular treaty,
presented in a very scholarly manner.7 0
In 1944, the Department of State commenced publication of a loose-leaf
series (multilith) entitled United States Treaty Developments. It was "planned
to meet the long-felt need of the Department of State and of international
lawyers, historians, researchers, and others."' 7' Unlike Malloy and Miller,
168 64 Stat. 980 (1950), 1 U.S.C.A. § 112a (1954).
168 The United Nations Treaty Series contains all treaties and agreements registered with
the UN by the United States or by a state which is a party to a treaty with the United States.
The earlier publication of the League of Nations was known by a similar name.
169 Sometimes Volume III is cited as "i Redmond" and Volume IV as "IV Trenwith" to
acknowledge the compilers of the last two volumes of "Malloy."
170 "The scheme of the work as a whole requires annotations which it is hoped will show
as far as possible the prior and subsequent diplomatic history of each document, the decisions
of courts and other tribunals which have considered it, and its relation to other documents in
the setting of surrounding and other circumstances." Plan of the Edition, as set forth in the
"Short Print" of Vol. 1, 26. 2 Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United
States (1931), gives the Jay Treaty, but fails to cite a single court decision.
'7' United States Treaty Developments, preface.
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this publication does not contain the text, English or foreign, but only a digest
of treaties and international agreements. It contains references to the TIAS
and "Stat." citations and such further information
with respect to each agreement when appropriate, notes respecting date and place
of signature, effective date, duration, citations to text, signatories, ratifications, ad-
herences, accessions, reservations, amendments, extensions, terminations, authorizing
and implementing legislation, Executive action, administrative interpretations, opin-
ions of the Attorney General, court decisions, and other relevant action.17 2
Unfortunately the use of this publication is limited to the loose-leaf pages issued
between 1944 and 1952 (covering the year 1950), but the Department of State
still has hopes of resuming publication in the future.
7. Indices to court decisions involving treaties . 3 Aside from Miller (for treaties
prior to July, 1863) and Treaty Developments (1944-50), the only systematic
sources to judicial decisions involving specific treaties are the "Statutory
Tables" of the United States Supretne Court Digest Annotated and the Federal
Code Annotated. The other national digests do not contain tables of "statutes
construed." Volume 14 of the former contains two sets of tables for cases men-
tioning treaties, namely: (a) "Table of Laws Cited and Construed" organized
into (i) "Foreign Countries," arranged alphabetically by treaties and by articles
of such treaties; and (ii) "Treaties and Agreements with Foreign Nations,"
arranged chronologically (by "Stat." citation) by country, and by article
of treaty; and (b) "Table of Statutes by Popular Name," including treaties by
date and "Stat." citation, without cases.
The volume entitled "Annotations to Uncodified Laws and Treaties" of the
Federal Code Annotated includes cases construing treaties in federal and state
courts and does not include cases merely mentioning treaties. The tables are
arranged in three groups, namely: (a) multilateral treaties, by date and by
article; (b) Pan-American treaties; and (c) treaties with specific countries, ar-
ranged alphabetically, by dates, and by subject of the treaty. (Neither service
has yet adjusted itself to the "UST" citation, but expects to do so.)
Shepard's Citations include treaties under its "statutes construed" table and
has added a new table on "UST" citations in the United States Citator and such
of the State Citators as contain the statutory tables. No such tables are included
in the National Reporter citators.
The appendix contains a series of tables listing the principal treaties of the
United States in effect (as of February, 1955) with foreign countries covering
(1) commercial relations; (2) rights of inheritance, acquisition, and ownership of
property; (3) consular powers in the settlement of estates; (4) double taxation
of income; and (5) double taxation of gifts and estates. These tables could not
have been prepared without the aid of the Office of Treaty Affairs in the Depart-
ment of State.
172 Ibid.
173 Extremely useful collections of cases regularly appear in the American Journal of Com-
parative Law, the American Journal of International Law, and, for the state of New York
(including the federal courts), in the Cornell Law Quarterly.
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10 Stat. 1005; 18- (2) 16
47 Stat. 1876
19 Stat. 628
12 Stat. 1003; 18- (2) 68
10 Stat. 909; 18- (2) 79
63 Stat. 1299
9 Stat. 881; 18- (2) 550
10 Stat. 916; 18- (2) 159









UST [not yet in force]
45 Stat. 2618








8 Stat. 484; 18- (2) 521
8 Stat. 458; 18- (2) 528
18 Stat. (2) 544
47 Stat. 2135
12 Stat. 1091; 18-(2) 594
33 Stat. 2105
18 Stat. (2) 748; 11- 587
53 Stat. 1731
46 Stat. 2743; 47- 2432
8 Stat. (2) 292
UST [not yet in force]
22 Stat. 963
'The treaty of April 26, 1951, was withdrawn from Senate, June 30, 1953.
2 The treaty of October 1, 1951 (approved by the Senate, July 21,1953), is not yet in force.
3 Deal with trade and shipping only.
Source: Office of Treaty Affairs, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as of September 20, 1955.
able II. Treaty Provisions Relating to Rights of Inheritence,










































































10 Stat. 1009; 18- (2) 18
47 Stat. 1877, 1879
12 Stat. 1004, 1010; 18-
(2) 69, 71
62 Stat. 1299
9 Stat. 886; 18- (2) 522
46 Stat. 2818, 2820
44 Stat. 2379, 2380
UST
49 Stat. 2660, 2662; UST
10 Stat. 996; 18- (2) 251
44 Stat. 2133, 2135; UST
31 Stat. 1939, 1940
UST
32 Stat. 1944
UST [not yet in
force]
45 Stat. 2618, 2620






45 Stat. 2641, 2642
54 Stat. 1739, 1741
47 Stat. 2136, 2138




11 Stat. 587, 590, 591;
18- (2) 748, 749, 750
53 Stat. 1731
22 Stat. 964
I The 1899 treaty with Great Britain was made applicable by notice given to the United States by HMG.
'Extended to Tunis, 1904. TS 434; 33 Stat. 2263.
3 Originally included under 1899 treaty with Great Britain.
Source: Derived from data supplied by the Office of Treaty Affairs, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as ofSeptember 20, 1955.








1899 I, II, V








1951 I, VI, IX










1850 I, V, VI
1937 I
1881 II
Table III. Treaty Provisions Relating to Competency and Rights of Consular
















































































































































I The 1899 treaty with Great Britain was made applicable to notice on the date indicated given to the United
States by HMG.
Extraterritorlal rights were renounced by the United States in 1905. TS 446; 34 Stat. 2870.
Source: Derived from data supplied by the Office of Treaty Affairs, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as of
September 20, 1955.
Official Citation
10 Stat. 1005, 1009; 18- (2)
16, 18
47 Stat. 1876, 1891
21 Stat. 776, 783
10 Stat. 900, 901; 18- (2)
560
10 Stat. 916, 921; 18- (2)
159, 161
1 UST 247
44 Stat. 2471, 2478
46 Stat. 2817, 2834, 2835
44 Stat. 2379, 2387
49 Stat. 2659, 2678, 2681
44 Stat. 2132, 2153
31 Stat. 1939, 1940
UST
33 Stat. 2122, 2129
32 Stat. 1944, 1945
45 Stat. 2618, 2635
UST
20 Stat. 725, 732
45 Stat. 2641, 2650
54 Stat. 1751, 1755
57 Stat. 800, 810
8 Stat. 484, 486; 18- (2)
521, 524
8 Stat. 458, 459; 18- (2)
528, 529
10 Stat. 1150, 1154; 18- (2)
546, 548
47 Stat. (2) 2135, 2153
12 Stat. 1091, 1095; 18- (2)
594, 596
62 Stat. (2) 1593
23 Stat. 711, 715
33 Stat. 2105, 2118
37 Stat. 1479, 1487
53 Stat. 1731, 1738
22 Stat. 968, 970
8 Stat. 458, 459; 18- (2)
528, 529
Table IV. Treaties and Other Agreements Relating






































































































































4 UST 2274; T.D. 6108
49 Stat. (2) 3871
4 UST 1647
4 UST
47 Stat. (2) 2620
47 Stat. (2) 2580
50 Stat. (2) 1399
56 Stat. 1399; T.D. 5206, 5157
2 UST 2235
47 Stat. (2) 2612
62 Stat. (2) 1730; T.D. 5692, 5777
61 Stat. (3) 2671
3 UST 4485
47 Stat. (2) 2604
49 Stat. (2) 3145
59 Stat. (2) 893; T.D. 5499
64 Stat. (3) B28
47 Stat. (2) 2627
UST
UST
47 Stat. (2) 2608; T.D. 6109
UST
UST
47 Stat. (2) 2612
48 Stat. (2) 1842
2 UST 2303; T.D. 5897
47 Stat. (2) 2599
UST
47 Stat. (2) 2578
UST
47 Stat. (2) 2601
[not printed]
62 Stat. (2) 1757; T.D. 5690, 5778
UST
2 UST 2378
47 Stat. (2) 2617
2 UST 2323
55 Stat. (2) 1363
47 Stat. (2) 2584
52 Stat. 1490
54 Stat. (2) 1759; T.D. 4975
2 UST 1751; T.D. 5867
3 UST 3821
3 UST3841
47 Stat. (2) 2587
60 Stat. 1377; T.D. 5532, 5569
60 Stat. 1389
5 UST
- Limited to relief from double taxation of earnings from the operation of ships and aircraft.
b Limited to relief from double taxation of earnings from the operation of ships.
- Supplemented and modified by a convention of 1952. TIAS 2833; UST.
d Limited to relief from double taxation of earnings from the operation of aircraft.
* Terminated or suspended by later treaty or law.
'Supplemental to earlier treaty.
Suspended during the war.
h Extended to the Netherlands East Indies.
I Extended to the Netherlands Antilles.
Source: Derived from data supplied by the Office of Treaty Affairs, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as of
September 20, 1955.
Table V. Treaties and Other Agreements Relating
to Double Taxation of Estates and Gifts
Country Date "Slip" Citation Official Citation
Australia 1953 TIAS 2903 4 UST 2264
1953& TIAS 2879 UST
Belgium 1954 TIAS UST
Canada 1944 TS 989 59 Stat. 915; T.D. 5455
1950b TIAS 2348 2 UST 2248
Finland 1952 TIAS 2595 3 UST 4464
France 1946 TIAS 1982 64 Stat. (3) B28
1948b T.AS 1982 UST
Greece 1950 TIAS 2901 UST
1953b TIAS 2901 UST
Ireland 1949 TIAS 2355 2 UST 2294
Italy 1955 TIAS UST
Japan 19540 TIAS 3175 UST
Norway 1949 TIAS 2358 2 UST 2353
Switzerland 1951 TIAS 2533 3 UST 3972
Union of South
Africa 1947 TIAS 2509 3 UST 3792
1950b TIAS 2509 3 UST 3812
United Kingdom 1945 TIAS 1547 60 Stat. 1391; T.D. 5565
- Gift taxation only.
b Supplemental to earlier treaty.
a Includes gift taxation.
Source: Derived from data supplied by the Office of Treaty Affairs, Legal Adviser, Department
of State, as of September 20, 1955.
